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POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE
CONTEMPORARY WORLD

No. 1, January-February 1985

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12 June 1985

USSR REPORT
POLITICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL AFFAIRS
THE WORKING CLASS AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
No. 1, JANUARY-FEBRUARY 1985

Except where indicated otherwise in the table of contents the following is a complete translation of the Russian-language journal RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNY MIR, published six times a year in Moscow by the Institute of the International Workers' Movement, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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REVOLUTIONARY DEMOCRACY AND THE WORKING CLASS

Moscow RABOCHIY KLAS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 85 pp 41-54

[Article by Aleksey Vasil'yevich Kiva, doctor of historical sciences and sector chief at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies; passages rendered in all capital letters printed in italics in original]

[Text] Revolutionary democracy is undoubtedly one of the most active and influential progressive political forces of the contemporary national-liberation movement. It would be difficult to imagine the development of the revolutionary process in the East without it. This applies not only to the countries of socialist orientation where it is in power, but in many respects to states which have taken the capitalist path of development too, as well as countries which are still fighting for national independence. The topic of this article will for the most part be revolutionary democracy in power.

As a collective category and a powerful social stratum in the historical process and in our day, revolutionary democracy is, in the words of V.I. Lenin, "a collection of the most dissimilar (in class status and interests, which are by no means the same thing) elements,"¹ a kind of conglomerate. Peasants, proletariat, in particular pre-proletariat, craftsmen, artisans, intelligentsia, petty bourgeoisie -- this is the picture, but far from a complete picture, of the social base of revolutionary democracy. In each particular case certain social-class forces predominate in this conglomerate; this essentially also predetermines the domestic and foreign policy of the revolutionary-democratic countries. But "from whatever milieu the revolutionary-democratic leaders rise, in one way or another they respond to impulses which primarily come from the peasant-petty bourgeois strata."²

In many respects the broad social composition of revolutionary democracy also determines the nature of the worldview principles of the movement. While the leftist groups of revolutionary democracy, which support a course of deep and progressive social changes, declare their devotion to scientific socialism and take practical steps in this direction and toward the development of broad international ties with the international communist movement, part of the right-wing grouping actually continues to adhere to the concept of "national socialism" and in many respects closes ranks with bourgeois positions. The bearers of this trend, if not in words then in deed, support moderate socioeconomic transformations for they are afraid that such transformations

might infringe on their personal interests. These forces are completely satisfied with what has been achieved and in some areas they would perhaps even like to move backwards.

The backbone of revolutionary democracy, which could conditionally be called centrist, lies between the left and the right trends. Its representatives want to stay clear of both the left and the right factions and are looking for their own path of social progress.³

Intensification of the processes of differentiation in the ranks of revolutionary democracy is characteristic of the 1970's and early 1980's; this is a logical result of the further development of national-democratic revolution and the aggravation of the class struggle. The demarcation line basically follows the issue of the scope and depth of social transformations and the problems of foreign economic, especially foreign political, relations.

Revolutionary democracy is experiencing pressure from both the right and the left. Pressure from the right usually comes from the bureaucratic bourgeoisie, the kulaks, part of the urban middle strata, in particular pro-bourgeois officialdom, and part of the urban petty bourgeoisie. In other words, it is based on a social stratum that is politically very active and relatively numerous in young states, and moreover is concentrated mainly in important political and cultural centers. These social class forces exert pressure from the right on national-democratic power in the stages of marked deepening of the content of the national-democratic revolution, especially when their material interests and advantageous position are infringed upon or former privileges are being reduced. This concerns above all those who enjoyed certain privileges in the years of colonialism or under the former reactionary regime. In certain cases such social-class forces as the middle bourgeoisie and even the remains of the landlord-feudal class have a political impact on revolutionary-democratic power.

Political pressure on ruling revolutionary democracy from the left comes primarily from the ultra-leftist middle strata who suffer from revolutionary impatience and are inclined toward extremism and adventurism and from the urban lower classes, especially the pauperized, lumpen strata. These forces must in no way be discounted, for they usually make up a substantial part of the urban population of developing countries and frequently have their own channels of influence on public opinion and even on the formulation of state policy. The ultraleftist-petty bourgeois trend which appears in attempts to force the revolutionary process, carry out transformations whose preconditions have not yet matured, and skip necessary steps of social evolution represents a serious danger for revolutionary forces. Many mistakes of an ultraleftist nature committed by the ruling and nonruling revolutionary democracy of the zone of the national-liberation movement have their own roots in this trend.

World capitalism and forces hostile to the socialist orientation try to influence the processes occurring in the ranks of revolutionary democracy. Using financial and technical-economic aid and the dependence of liberated countries on the world capitalist economy and resorting to all kinds of subversive actions, imperialism tries to change the course of the countries of the noncapitalist path of development. The policy of imperialism is focused

on stimulating ruling circles in certain countries to swing to the right and on provoking or aggravating conflicts in the ranks of revolutionary democracy itself on the level of individual countries and on the intercountry level.

Imperialism tries with even greater zeal to provoke dissension, above all between the right and centrist groupings of revolutionary democracy on the one hand and communists on the other. The goal is, in the first place, to weaken the communists and, secondly, to isolate revolutionary democracy from other revolutionary forces of contemporary times and above all from the USSR and the socialist community. In recent years, especially since R. Reagan's administration came into power in the United States, world imperialism has sharply stepped up efforts to destabilize the situation in the countries of socialist orientation. This applies above all to those states which are conducting a consistent antiimperialist course and developing broad internationalist ties with the USSR and the socialist community.

Local reactionaries, for their part, try to influence the course of evolution of revolutionary democracy in order to ultimately achieve its degeneration, as happened, for example, in Egypt and Somalia.

Like local reactionaries, imperialism could have an even greater negative impact on revolutionary democracy were it not for the policy of the USSR, the other countries of the socialist community, and the international communist movement. Their all-out support of the struggle of revolutionary-democratic states against imperialism and neocolonialism and for national and social emancipation promotes the socioeconomic progress of radical regimes, convergence of the views of revolutionary democrats with the theory of scientific socialism, and the establishment of broad and multilateral ties with the countries of socialism.

As a definite social-political phenomenon, independent of the socially adverse and varied trends which exist in its ranks, revolutionary democracy undoubtedly plays a historically progressive role. It is an antiimperialist, antineocolonialist force which objectively acts on the side of world socialism in its opposition to world capitalism. Its historical merit is that it expresses (to a certain extent and with a certain degree of consistency, of course) the interests of the broad popular masses.

V.I. Lenin's approach to Russian populism and to the theories of nonproletarian socialism is of great methodological importance in order to correctly evaluate the historical role of revolutionary democracy in the contemporary stage of development of the world revolutionary process. In his work "The Agrarian Program of Social Democracy in the First Russian Revolution" he noted, "The mistake of certain Marxists is that while criticizing the THEORY of the populists ["narodniki"], they overlook its historically real and historically lawful CONTENT IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SERFDOM. They criticize. . . petty bourgeois SOCIALISM and forget that these theories express progressive, revolutionary petty bourgeois DEMOCRATISM. . ."4

The logic of the struggle for decolonization (the elimination of the colonial legacy) is such that even those factions of ruling revolutionary democracy whose aspirations do not go beyond the confines of general democratic

transformations and who dream of "national socialism" with its "good," "nonexploitative" capitalists strike a blow against international capitalism and objectively (to one degree or another) against national capitalism by their activity against imperialism and neocolonialism. Without its ties to transnational corporations (TNC's) and international capital, national capitalism in most developing countries can hardly assume the functions of a system-forming structure.

The party of a revolutionary-democratic movement is almost a mirror image of the level of ideological-political development of the particular revolutionary-democratic movement. A certain pattern can be discerned in the development of revolutionary-democratic parties. Thus, as a rule a party of the NATIONAL FRONT or PARTY-MOVEMENT type has conformed to the stage of the struggle for national independence.

The appearance of the party-movement was historically caused; it conformed to a certain level of development of national-liberation revolutions. The party-movement grew out of that conception of the revolutionary struggle which many prominent revolutionary-democratic leaders held. They assumed that the national-front type party, uniting almost the entire people, would be both the motive force of the revolution and the best guarantee against counterrevolution and coup d'etat attempts with the intent of impeding the country's development toward socialism. They interpreted the very concept of "people" [narod] as something unique, for the most part socially homogeneous, and they most often represented the division of society into classes by the principle: on the one hand, the entire people (with the exception of clusters of deviates), ready at the first call to undertake the building of socialism together, and on the other, colonialism and imperialism. At that time (the 1960's), most leaders of revolutionary democracy rejected both the class division of local society and correspondingly the class struggle as the motive force of revolution. It seemed to them at the time that they would come to socialism by a different path than the one which the countries of real socialism took and the one which right-wing social democracy proposes. Many revolutionary democratic leaders in fact ignored the presence of bourgeois elements, the privileged stratum nourished by the colonialists in the city, and the feudal, semifeudal, or the tribal-clan elite in the countryside; and indeed, to this day they present a significant problem for revolutionary democratic power. Their tendency to reproduction has been preserved even in conditions of independent national-progressive development.

There were also many illusions in regard to former mother countries. The fact of the replacement of colonialism by neocolonialism with its mortal danger for independent national-progressive development was in many cases realized too late. For example, English officers continued to command in the police and army of Ghana after it had started on the path of noncapitalist development.

Life, the class struggle, and the policies of imperialism soon dispelled many of these illusions. But I would like to emphasize once again that these illusions had objective roots. They are a practically inevitable component of the worldview of nonproletarian revolutionaries; all the more so in conditions of a low level of economic development and weak social-class stratification of society. The fact that most developing countries achieved independence in a

peaceful way without armed struggle as a result of concessions on the part of former mother countries also had an effect.

Already at some point in the mid-1960's the trend to create vanguard revolutionary-democratic parties which unite the most politically trained and conscious champions of the socialist future in their ranks, parties guided in their activities by the theory of scientific socialism built on the principles of democratic centralism, was beginning to supplant the party-movements, which in fact were nationwide elements.

As V.I. Lenin repeatedly emphasized, real life is more complex than the most sophisticated conception. Political experience forced genuine revolutionaries to resort to creating vanguard revolutionary-democratic parties even before a sociopolitical base adequate for them matured. Thus, the working class had not yet become a progressive social class and the leading revolutionary force in terms of its quantitative and especially qualitative characteristics. In a number of cases it had only arisen and was in the stage of separation from the rest of the population mass, so it did not even represent a "class in itself" -- in the real sense of the word it simply did not exist. It was, rather, a substratum of the preproletariat, the semiproletariat.

The creation of vanguard parties became possible when a number of internal and external factors were favorably combined. The external factor is the existence of real socialism in the world, its unselfish international aid and support, the power of its example, and its invaluable experience which it generously shares with all our planet's revolutionaries. As for internal factors, this means above all greater political maturity in ruling revolutionary democracy itself and its growing readiness to utilize world experience and put the theory of noncapitalist development into practice.

Needless to say, the establishment of a vanguard party is usually preceded by painstaking, intense work, often lasting many years, by party leaders and activists in the countries of socialist orientation. This is generally accompanied by bitter class struggle and regrouping of forces in the ranks of revolutionary democracy itself. Occasionally the creation of the vanguard party involves a lengthy search for the best solution to this problem. In particular, a great deal of strength, energy, persistence, and at the same time self-control was required of the revolutionaries of democratic Yemen in order to form the Yemeni Socialist Party on the principles of scientific socialism.⁵

In Angola, for example, this question was on the agenda of the 1st MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola] Congress (1977). "The MPLA has fulfilled its historical mission as a national-liberation movement," emphasized Agostinho Neto, party leader at that time, at the congress. "The construction of popular democracy and socialism requires qualitative leaps on a political, ideological, and organizational basis..."⁶ The discussion of ways to solve this problem involved three views: some people believed that the MPLA must be dissolved and an completely new party created; others favored forming a Marxist-Leninist party while preserving the MPLA as a democratic organization; a third group favored converting the MPLA into the vanguard party. The third point of view triumphed.⁷

In order for the vanguard party to become the ruling and guiding force of society as soon as possible after its creation, an enormous amount of preliminary work is necessary: precise ideological-organizational principles must be worked out; personnel must be trained; ways and methods of work with the masses with consideration of national-specific conditions must be determined, and so forth. But even in this case the time from declaring the formation of the vanguard party to its conversion into a real guiding force of society runs to many years.

The distinguishing feature of vanguard parties is that they declare their devotion to the theory of scientific socialism and the ideas of proletarian internationalism. As a rule these parties are founded on the principles of democratic centralism; party organizations are most often created on a production-territorial basis; admission into the party is strictly individual; and each party member must belong to and work actively in one of the party organizations. These characteristics, as we see, bring the vanguard revolutionary-democratic party close to a Marxist-Leninist party.

However, Marxism-Leninism is not always deeply assimilated in all three of its component parts (in particular the philosophy) by the members of vanguard parties, especially when we are talking about representatives of the middle and lower links; the social composition of these parties is also different. As a rule the proportion of employees and intelligentsia is high in vanguard revolutionary-democratic parties while the proportion of representatives of the regular, above all industrial, proletariat is small in the interim.

The formation of vanguard revolutionary-democratic parties, their assimilation of scientific-socialist ideology, and the development of ties with the international communist movement is a complex and lengthy process which has its phases and stages. It takes place under the influence of many factors; reflected in it are features of the country's socioeconomic and political development, the class struggle, the ideological atmosphere, and mass consciousness and the situation of the countries of socialist orientation in the region and in the international arena and their ties with capitalist and socialist states. But in any case this process is dialectically contradictory (just as noncapitalist development of liberated countries is itself contradictory).

This contradictory character stems above all from the low level of general cultural development and political consciousness of the broad labor strata of the population and from the strong influence of backward forms of ideology (nationalism, religion, tribalism, caste survivals, and so forth) on the masses; this can leave its mark on the assimilation by some of the nonproletarian revolutionaries of scientific socialism and lead to substitution of a collection of dogmas and platitudes, an eclectic blend of some principles of scientific socialism with religious and nationalistic views, instead of a vital, steadily developing doctrine. Weak economic development sometimes pushes revolutionaries (especially those of nonproletarian origin) to work out and elaborate principles of wage leveling. Inadequate social stratification of the population and the absence of those social-class forces (above all a proletariat which is aware of itself as a

class, as well as politically mature strata of the peasantry) which the revolutionary party can rely on in order to function successfully naturally complicate the problem of party construction. The absence of firm democratic traditions and the tendency of the predominant peasant masses to deify the personality of leading political leaders in turn encourage the emergence of authoritarian, dictatorial tendencies in the leadership of the state.

For the successful activity of vanguard revolutionary-democratic parties which adopt scientific socialism as their theoretical base, it is very important to create an appropriate sociopolitical base. And today the position of Marxism-Leninism on the indissoluble tie between the theory of scientific socialism and those social-class forces which are capable by virtue of their objective social-historical position of being its successors has not lost and never will lose its historical significance. Let us recall that during the conversation with the delegation of Mongolian revolutionaries in Moscow in 1921, the leader of the world proletariat V.I. Lenin particularly emphasized the inadvisability of renaming the nonproletarian (peasant) party a "communist" party, emphasizing that "there is still a great deal of work for the revolutionaries to do on their state, economic, and cultural construction before pastoral elements become a proletarian mass which can then help 'convert' the people's-revolutionary party into a communist party." Lenin also brilliantly foresaw the danger of such "conversions" where a "simple change of labels is harmful and dangerous."⁸

The creation of a vanguard party, a party of working people based on the principles of scientific socialism and proletarian internationalism, and proclamation of the national proletariat as the leading political force of society should, in the logic of things, signify the appearance of a qualitatively new phase in the development of national-democratic revolution, in particular the readiness of the laboring masses to assimilate the progressive ideology of contemporary times -- Marxism-Leninism -- and the national proletariat's acceptance of the leadership of the revolution, which signifies the class maturity of the latter for this role.

However, there is no doubt that the formation of a party of scientific socialism, when the conditions have matured for it, does not just have a positive effect on the course of capitalist development. In itself it is a result of the course of changes in the countries of socialist orientation. Successes in economic and cultural construction, progressive social changes, and above all the increase in the social significance and political role of working people, the quantitative and qualitative growth of the proletariat, in particular the factory-plant proletariat, accelerates the conversion of the nonproletarian revolutionary party into a party of scientific socialism. I would like to dwell on this question in more detail.

It is commonly known that the working class is the only one of all contemporary classes and social groups of the population whose vital interests make it the leading revolutionary force. In the article "Discord in the European Worker Movement," V.I. Lenin wrote: "Marxism is most easily, most quickly, and more completely and firmly assimilated by the working class and its ideologists in conditions of the greatest development of large industry. Backward economic relations or relations retarded in their development always

lead to the appearance of those advocates of the worker movement who assimilate only certain facets of Marxism, only certain parts of the new worldview or certain slogans and demands, and are not able to break decisively with all the traditions of the bourgeois worldview. . ." 9

Consequently, the transition of revolutionary-democratic parties to the position of scientific socialism will take place more successfully as the proletariat takes a more active role in these parties. Nonetheless, this question must be approached with consideration for the degree of maturity of the proletariat in Afro-Asian countries, in particular in the states of socialist orientation, most of whose working classes have not yet been converted from a "class in itself" to a "class for itself."

Analysis of the place and role of the proletariat in the countries of socialist orientation shows that relations between the working class and trade unions, on the one hand, and revolutionary-democratic authority, on the other, have not always developed satisfactorily. There are many reasons for this. Perhaps the basic of them is that two historical social forces interact -- petty bourgeois democracy and the proletariat. And petty bourgeois democracy in the stage of the struggle for national independence and for a long time after it has been acquired appears on the political scene as the leading radical social force, while the young proletariat of many countries of the national-liberation movement zone cannot make a claim to such a role; its historical hour has not yet struck. The interrelations of the two forces, one of which must sooner or later give up its place to the basic classes of contemporary society -- the proletariat or the bourgeoisie, always develop in a complicated way.

Recognizing (or intuitively guessing) its historically transitional role, petty bourgeois democracy tries to consolidate its position before consolidation of the proletariat, and also, incidentally, of the national bourgeoisie; it even tries to impede their establishment as classes with their own political organizations. The struggle between the petty bourgeois and proletarian democracy is especially evident in the example of certain Arab countries where petty bourgeois democracy has substantial political experience, created its social support (including among the working class) and its own political parties quite a long time back, worked out the ideology and its own understanding of ways toward social progress, and moreover has powerful economic levers and at times a large amount of financial means at its disposal as well.

Petty bourgeois democracy, have fully cut away the roots of the economic power and political influence of the national bourgeoisie and the feudal landowners, sees its proletarian democracy as its main political rival (all the more so when represented by its political vanguard). It is true that common goals of the struggle against imperialism and local reaction and the arms race and for general democratic transformations as well as a certain similarity of the social-class base bring petty bourgeois democracy and proletarian democracy together. But at the same time this leads to a struggle for influence with the masses and encourages rivalry. Petty bourgeois democracy today frequently takes over certain program goals and slogans of the Marxists and tries to one degree of consistency or another to realize them in

practice; this is characteristic, for example, of Arab Ba'thism [Arab Socialist Resurrectionist Party].

And only while abandoning the foundation of petty bourgeois democratism to some degree and gradually moving to the scientific socialist position do petty bourgeois revolutionaries, or rather their most progressive representatives, begin to act hand in hand with proletarian revolutionaries and with Marxist-Leninists. In real life this often happens. At the June 1983 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, Yu.V. Andropov said: "The countries who have chosen the socialist orientation are the closest to us in the former colonial world. Not only common antiimperialist, peace-loving goals in foreign policy but also common ideals of social justice and progress unite us with them."¹⁰

Revolutionary democrats of many countries have proven themselves firm supporters of genuine social progress and allies of Marxist-Leninists in the struggle against imperialism and for socialism. But the crux of the matter is that they are still not quite revolutionary democrats. They are a transitional political force. In a certain sense they are still revolutionary democrats while on many points they are already revolutionaries, close to Marxist-Leninists.

However, if one is speaking of the prime causes of the frictions which have arisen and which at times are still arising between the working class and trade unions, on the one hand, and revolutionary-democratic authority, on the other, attention should also be focused on the position of the working class or, to be more precise, certain detachments of the working class and some trade unions or others. Of course, the concepts "workers" [rabochiye] and "trade unions" [profsoyuzy] may have different qualitative characteristics. There are revolutionary workers and trade unions and there are reformist workers and trade unions. Finally, there are workers -- and the developing countries have many of them -- who because of their politically and culturally backward and downtrodden nature are frequently used by reactionary forces against the interests of the working class.

In Tanzania, Ethiopia, and a number of other countries of socialist orientation, trade unions, or rather their leaders indoctrinated in the spirit of "economist" trade-unionism, have not always had a perfect understanding of the tasks facing a country which has undertaken the course of breaking with capitalism and developing in the direction of socialism. Without taking account of the difficulties which inevitably arise when the economy is converted from one social basis of development to another as well as because of the subversive activities of imperialism and local reactionaries, trade unions headed by "economist" leaders and standing in opposition to the government, have begun to propose demands which far exceed the level of social labor productivity achieved and which are practically unrealizable, as well as demands for the immediate improvement of social conditions and sharply increased wages.

SELU (Confederation of Trade Unions of Ethiopia), the former trade union association of Ethiopia, which was indoctrinated by trade union bureaucrats of the reformist International Confederation of Labor (MKSP), came in conflict with military-revolutionary authorities soon after the overthrow of the

monarchy. Workers were politically disoriented by the efforts of the local trade union bureaucracy, and peasants, who immediately saw the new revolutionary authorities as their deliverer from feudal exploitation, came to the city in military overcoats to defend the revolutionary gains. This is a rare occurrence in the history of revolutions, but it is revealing: the proletariat can act as the "grave digger" of the bourgeoisie and in opposition to exploitative relations in general only when certain conditions are present -- when it recognizes itself as a class and recognizes its historical mission, that is, after it has been converted from a "class in itself" to a "class for itself." But prior to this, rebellious-anarchistic actions predominate and the proletariat frequently becomes a toy in the hands of political forces alien to it. From the history of Afro-Asian countries it is well-known that trade unions which have taken an active part in overthrowing reactionary, proimperialist regimes have sometimes energetically joined the path of struggle against progressive regimes, abandoning the narrow interests of their own organization. This only speaks of the fact that the level of political consciousness of trade union members, above all their leaders, of course, did not rise higher than the momentary interests of ordinary "economist" trade-unionism. "Economist" trade-unionism is the delayed-action bomb which colonizers and rightist reformists tried to incorporate into the worker movement.

Neocolonialists in young independent states, among them the countries of socialist orientation, are also following the same line. Taking advantage of the enormous difference in social labor productivity in mother countries and former colonies, branches of transnational corporations in young states frequently offer higher wages than national enterprises can afford and sometimes grant workers certain privileges. The neocolonialists' propaganda, like all their practices, is directed to prove that politics has nothing to do with workers and that their interests lie exclusively in the plane of the struggle to improve their own economic position.

Of course, neither the just nature of trade union demands that the working and living conditions of the working people be improved nor the fact that there can be instances where the legal demands of trade unions are ignored in revolutionary-democratic countries can be doubted. In any case, in conflicts which have taken place in the past between trade unions and revolutionary-democratic authorities, trade unions, in standing up for the rights of the working people, have by no means always acted contrary to nation-wide interests and the interests of social progress.¹¹

Yes, conflicts related to the working class's material situation can also arise in the countries of socialist orientation. Colonialism left a burdensome legacy to young states in the area of labor payment for various social and occupational groups, and this is not easy to put an end to quickly. For example, the following question was posed from the forum of the FRELIMO [Mozambique Liberation Front] Party Congress held in April 1983: why do the wages of an employee of the management apparatus of one of the enterprises remain, as in colonial times, 10 times higher than the wages of a skilled worker?¹² But the solution to such questions, as far as we can judge, lies not on the path of defending narrow occupational shop, or clan interests but

just the opposite -- in the general process of eliminating the burdensome colonial legacy.

A retrospective view of the history of interrelations between the proletariat and revolutionary-democratic authority allows two phases to be singled out. In the first phase, which could theoretically mark the period of the late 1950's and the first half of the 1960's, a mistaken representation of the working class as a supposedly privileged stratum of the population was widespread in revolutionary democracy. It was said that workers received stable wages which were many times greater than the peasants' incomes and lived in cities relatively well-provided with services and utilities while the peasants, the main force of the national-liberation movement, eked out a half-beggarly existence and were for all practical purposes deprived of the blessings of contemporary civilization.

Workers were accused of class egoism because they advanced demands that their material situation be improved, so to speak, without consideration of the state's capabilities as well as the standard of living of other strata of the population, in particular the peasantry. Many revolutionary-democratic leaders in general underestimated the working class's role in society, contrasting it with the peasantry as the main revolutionary force of society. For its part the working class considered the measures of the revolutionary-democratic authorities (most often compulsory) to freeze wages and limit the right to strike and so on an attack on their vital rights. Rigorous economy campaigns for the purpose of developing the national economy and the rise in the cost of living primarily struck the urban population, in particular its most low-paid part, that is, the workers. This aroused discontent in the ranks of the workers. The situation became especially threatening where a stratum of nouveau-rich and all kinds of smart operators and speculators prospered against a background of decline in the standard of living of the working people.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's revolutionary-democratic leaders, above all the leaders of the radical school, more and more began to understand that successful development on the path to socialism was inseparable from steady growth in the role of the working class in the life of society. (However, it should be emphasized that mistaken views of the role of the working class in the life of society still have not been eliminated among revolutionary democrats).

This was also undoubtedly encouraged by certain positive changes in the quantitative and qualitative composition of the working class, among them a rise in its level of organization and political consciousness.¹³ Without specially examining this question, we will recall that by the late 1970's, according to data, some of it estimated, the working class numbered about 30,000 people in Benin, 50,000-60,000 people in the Congo, about 100,000 people in Ethiopia, and the same number (excluding agricultural workers) in Angola. The most numerous detachment of the working class was represented by the Algerian proletariat (at least 500,000 people, and approximately the same number working abroad).

Data on the number of proletariat in the countries of socialist orientation, like that of many developing countries on the whole, must of course be critically interpreted. Because of the imperfection of statistics and other reasons, the pre-proletariat, the semi-proletariat, workers in small and extremely small enterprises, and sometimes even employees and hired persons in general, are often included in the category "working class."

As for the contemporary proletariat working in factories, plants, transportation, docks, large plantations, and so forth, in other words at those enterprises which employ large worker collectives and where it is possible to create professional organizations for them and carry on political-indoctrination and mass organizational work, with certain exceptions it is fairly small in the countries of socialist orientation. And there is one more important feature: in certain revolutionary-democratic states, in the first years after independence has been won, for a number of reasons the process of deproletarianization takes place; in particular this process involves a decline in the number of factory-plant proletariat and plantation-farm workers as a result of a substantial decline in production and the fragmentation of parts of the plantations into small plots. This phenomenon is a temporary one, of course, but it must also be kept in mind.

In order to correctly evaluate the national proletariat's role in a state of socialist orientation, not only the leading trends (the increase in the number of proletariat and its increased class consciousness) must be taken into account but secondary, collateral ones as well. In particular, consideration must be taken of the impact the capitalist sector and the enclave of foreign enterprise have on this process and whether the proletariat is receiving an education in class struggle at state enterprises; the attitude of revolutionary-democratic authorities toward the proletariat must be considered, and so on.

Essentially, the possibilities of the proletariat becoming a reliable sociopolitical bulwark in a state of socialist orientation depend on the strength of the proletariat itself as well as the progressive regime's attitude toward it. In Ghana, for example, the working class did not support the government of Kwame Nkrumah at a critical moment not because it was weak. On the contrary, at that time the Ghanaian proletariat was already one of the most organized and powerful detachments of the working class in the countries of Tropical Africa (for example, 235,000 people were employed in Ghana's processing industry in 1960, and about 500,000 in 1969). The Ghanaian working people remained passive toward the overthrow of Nkrumah's government because their interests were continually infringed upon by the authorities while militant trade union leaders were subjected to punitive measures.

The predominant trends toward change in the living conditions of various strata of the working class which is taking form, in particular former commune members who are closely tied to the countryside, must also be taken into account. A decline in the standard of living of the semipeasant-proletariat who work in the city but have families in the country is possible not as a result of a decline in its real wages but in consequence of a sharp deterioration of the situation in their native countryside. Some of the workers (especially the skilled ones) may find themselves in a worse material

situation after enterprises of the private, above all foreign, sector are nationalized.

Proceeding from the well-known position of scientific socialism on the proletariat's historical mission, praising the beneficial influence of the international revolutionary worker movement on the development of national-liberation revolutions very highly, and finally bearing in mind the potential capabilities of the national proletariat, the leaders of many countries of socialist orientation point to the special role of the working class in revolution. The 1970 constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen already speaks of the historical role of the working class as the leading force of society.¹⁴ And documents of the revolutionary-democratic party OPONF, the forerunner of the Yemeni Socialist Party, emphasized that "socialism represents an order based on organized revolutionary activity which is waged only under conditions of the supremacy of the working class and its party called on to lead the working masses in the name of achieving their goals."¹⁵

The program documents of the KPT [Communist Party of Tunisia], FRELIMO, the MPLA [Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola]-Labor Party, the PNRB [expansion unknown], and a number of other parties point out the leading role of the working class in the future.

Proclaiming the working class to be the leading social force is of fundamental significance. The ground is thereby knocked out from under those people who are inclined to pit the working class against the peasantry and continue to consider the peasantry the leading force of socialist revolution. But practical measures to create the maximal conditions for the quickest possible conversion of the proletariat into a "class for itself" are even more important. At times discrepancies are encountered between the proclamation of the proletariat as the leading social force, and the creation of realistic opportunities for it have a growing impact on the policies of the revolutionary-democratic state. At the same time, it is gratifying that in recent years representatives of the working class have begun to be more actively involved in carrying out important functions in state and social life and in managing production. This trend has been revealed especially clearly in the People's Republic of Yemen, Angola, and in certain other countries. Many revolutionary-democratic leaders in fact help increase the proletariat's organization and raise its political literacy and class consciousness and further the unification of the worker movement with the ideas of scientific socialism.

Many examples attest to the fact that even a small proletariat which is still in the stage of consolidation represents a real political force. Thus, in the Congo demonstrations and strikes organized by trade unions created the conditions for eliminating in 1963 the proimperialist dictatorship of abbot F. Yulu. Trade unions took an active part in overthrowing the feudal sultan regime in Zanzibar and the island part of Tanzania. The large role of the working class in the revolutionary transformations in a number of countries of socialist orientation is also well-known.

However, exaggeration of the revolutionary potentials of the proletariat would perhaps be even more dangerous than underestimating them, since this could involve incorrect decisions and ultraleftist actions which threaten the socialist choice.

When countries are extremely backward socioeconomically, the conversion of the proletariat into the leading social force is undoubtedly a lengthy process. We repeat that in most of them the regular proletariat, in particular the factory-plant proletariat, is only still being formed and the workers often do not have elementary education; their class consciousness is burdened by the weight of patriarchal survivals; the establishment of class consciousness of the proletariat occurs in bitter struggle with nationalist and religious worldviews and with petty bourgeois notions.

Here is a description of the proletariat of the People's Republic of the Congo given by a prominent son of the Congolese people, M. Nguabi: "Despite its small size, the Congolese working class remains the country's main revolutionary force. Nonetheless, language and religious barriers and tribal-clan and regionalistic survivals and traditions predetermine that this force in the Congo does not yet have its own decisive impact on the course of the revolution."¹⁶

Almost 10 years later the chairman of the Congolese Labor Party Central Committee and president of the People's Republic of the Congo, Denis Sassou-Nguesso, confirmed this evaluation:

"The proletariat of the Congo consists of industrial and agricultural workers. Their number is small; this is a result of the level of development of production forces. But the predominance of an unskilled work force over the remaining elements of the proletariat accounts for this; it is apparent that this circumstance has a negative impact on the organization of proletarian ranks.

"The organic ties which have taken shape between the proletariat and the rural laborers are of dual significance. On the one hand, this determines the proletariat's predisposition to a real alliance with the peasants, while on the other it retards the awakening of its class consciousness. The lack of militant traditions and the influence of origin have an effect here."¹⁷

Many other revolutionary-democratic leaders point to the fact that the young national proletariat frequently has still not been liberated from prejudices inherent in the traditional society and is still closely tied to the countryside and its way of life. Our workers are not like European workers, noted one of the activists of the People's Revolutionary Party of Benin. They not only feed their own families but often relatives in the countryside as well on rather meager wages. They obey age-old customs and traditions. And nonetheless this is the future working class which is already aware of its own power and inevitably will become the leader of our revolution.

The evaluations given above of the role and place of the national proletariat in most countries of socialist orientation in fact continue in force in our day as well.

The proportion of the working class in revolutionary-democratic parties, including the new type of party, the party of the working people, obviously reflects more or less precisely the real position of the proletariat in society. Artificial exaggeration of the representation of the proletariat in revolutionary parties, in our opinion, could have negative consequences for revolutionary development. On one hand, this could lead to a relative reduction in the representation of social strata and sections which objectively play the most active role in the revolutionary process in a given segment of the historical development of liberated countries -- the intelligentsia, employees, students, servicemen, and so on. On the other hand, the party is reinforced through the replenishment of its ranks with representatives of the working class, above all factory-plant representatives, who are aware of themselves as a class called on to fulfill their historical mission and are prepared for revolutionary actions. Excessively broad representation in revolutionary parties of the pre-proletariat, the semi-proletariat working in small and extremely small semi-cottage industry enterprises, and the proletariat which has taken on the heavy burden of nationalistic, tribalistic, and religious prejudices and petty bourgeois and "economist" trade-unionist notions and so forth could lead only to the amorphousness of the party and not only not accelerate but also retard its evolution toward scientific socialism. Of course, the social immaturity of a class is a good breeding ground both for social passivity and for social pseudoactivism, leftism, and political adventurism. It is no accident that leftists and even openly counterrevolutionary groups often recruit all kinds of supporters from this milieu.

The example of the Communist Party of India attests to the fact that the question of representation of the working class in Marxist-Leninist parties of developing countries is also far from simple. At its 12th Congress (March 1982) the experienced and influential party which operates in a country with a relatively developed economy and many millions of proletarians, including contemporary workers, was represented by delegates, only a little more than 13 percent of whom were workers in origin.¹⁸ It seems that this was by no means accidental. This is a characteristic feature of the development of the communist movement in former colonies and semicolonies where local economic and sociopolitical conditions leave their mark.

It can be assumed that after transformation into the party of scientific socialism the present revolutionary-democratic parties will also differ for a long time in their social composition (and above all by the representation of the working class in them) from the Marxist-Leninist parties of developed countries. This is possibly one of the features of development of the revolutionary process in the countries of the East which stems from the complex of nationally specific conditions, the social-class structure, and the specifics of the formation and political development of the proletariat. V.I. Lenin emphasized that the revolutions in these countries which are distinguished by a great diversity of conditions will show "greater originality" than the Russian revolution.¹⁹ Suffice it to say that by 1940, when the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, which had become a member of the Comintern with the rights of a sympathizing organization, already stood in the positions of Marxism-Leninism, while the country had entered the stage of

socialist transformations, less than 7 percent of this party's representatives were from the working class.²⁰

Even before being converted into a "class for itself," the proletariat can play an important role in the life of a country of socialist orientation and be a reliable mainstay of a progressive regime on the condition that the national-democratic authorities, who help increase the numbers of the proletariat, its organization, and political consciousness and involve progressive representatives of the proletariat in governing the affairs of state and of the whole society even then (before it is promoted to the position of a leading sociopolitical force and the class-leader), strive toward this.

FOOTNOTES

1. V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Works], Vol 31, p 246.
2. K.N. Brutents, "Sovremennyye natsional'no-osvoboditel'nyye revolyutsii" [Contemporary National-Liberation Revolutions], Moscow, 1974, p 332.
3. For more detail see: K.N. Brutents, "Osvobodivshiesya strany v 70-e gody" [Liberated Countries in the 1970's], Moscow, 1979, pp 51-77.
4. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 16, p 213.
5. Among others see: A.S. Shin, "Natsional'no-demokraticheskiye revolyutsii. Nekotoryye voprosy teorii i praktiki" [National-Democratic Revolutions. Some Questions of the Theory and Practice], Moscow, 1981, pp 105-138; V.V. Naumkin, "Narodnaya Demokraticheskaya Respublika Yyemen" [The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen], Moscow, 1982.
6. "I s'yezd Narodnogo dvizheniya za osvobozhdeniye Angoly (MPLA)" [The 1st Congress of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)], Moscow, 1978, p 23.
7. See: PMS [PROBLEMS OF PEACE AND SOCIALISM], No 3, 1982, p 32.
8. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 44, p 233.
9. Ibid., Vol 20, p 65.
10. "Materialy Plenuma Tsentral'nogo Komiteta KPSS 14-15 iyunya 1983 goda" [Materials of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 14-15 June 1983], Moscow, 1983, p 23.
11. For example, it is difficult to accuse workers of class egoism if they sometimes do not receive wages for months, which has already happened in certain countries with progressive regimes; one can understand them also when because of incompetent, poor management, the standard of living of the working people abruptly slides downward, depriving them of the opportunity to make ends meet.

12. See: PRAVDA, 3 August 1983.
13. For more detail see: L. Fridman and S. Voronin, "Industrialization and the Proletariat of Afro-Asian Countries" in AZIYA I AFRIKA SEGODNYA, Nos 10, 11, 1980; and same authors, "The Contemporary Industrial Proletariat of Asia and Africa" in NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 5, 1982.
14. "Constitution of People's Democratic Republic of Yemen," Aden, 1970.
15. "The Program of the United Political Organization National Front on the Stage of the National Democratic Revolution," Aden, 1975.
16. M. Nguabi, "A Militant Program of Construction" in ZA RUBEZHOM, No 16, 1973, p 18.
17. Denis Sassou-Nguesso, "Ten Years of the Congolese Labor Party" in KOMMUNIST, No 3, 1980, pp 85-86.
18. "The Documents of the 12th Congress of the Communist Party of India," New Delhi, 1983, p 163.
19. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 45, p 381.
20. See: MEMO, No 10, 1976, p 22.

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POLITICAL, SOCIAL VIEWS OF SPANISH WORKING CLASS SINCE FRANCO

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[Article by Sergey Markovich Khenkin, candidate of historical sciences and scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of the International Worker Movement: "Some Features of the Sociopolitical Consciousness of Spain's Working Class"]

[Excerpts] The question of the degree of preparedness of the broad masses of working people for the struggle for social transformations became very urgent in connection with the transition from Francoist dictatorship to bourgeois democracy which began in Spain in the mid-1970's. Having shattered the foundations of the Francoist regime through a persistent heroic struggle, the proletariat made an important contribution to establishing the system of bourgeois parliamentarianism. The possibilities of working class influence on the country's contemporary development increased as a result of the victory in the October 1982 parliamentary elections of the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), to which millions of working people gave their votes. The coming of the PSOE to power, while opening a new phase in the development of the democratization process, at the same time clearly established major changes in the mass sociopolitical consciousness of the Spanish workers, including their attitude toward the sociopolitical systems of capitalist society, political orientations, and social ideals.

Leaving aside everyday consciousness, an attempt has been made in the article to reveal certain fundamentally important aspects of the mass sociopolitical consciousness of the workers of Spain, and in particular to explain how features of the formative process of democratic society and the class struggle in the country, refracted through the prism of individual or collective social experience, are reflected in it.

An intricate complex of political-ideological, socioeconomic, and psychological factors strongly but ambiguously influenced the sociopolitical consciousness of the working class in the formative stage of democracy.

We are speaking, above all, of the process (distinguished by great originality) of eliminating the Francoist dictatorship and the flexible strategy of the Spanish bourgeoisie during this process. Francoism was not eliminated as a result of military defeat or overthrow. Although the mass

worker movement became a major catalyst of the transition from authoritarian dictatorship to bourgeois democracy, the bourgeoisie stood at the head of this process. Under pressure from the working people, the bourgeoisie implemented a number of reforms focused -- despite all their narrowness -- on satisfying the demands of the opposition forces. The situation in Spain was such that the very possibility of legal and free functioning of leftist organizations was determined to a great extent by the will of the ruling circles which in controlling the levers of power could at their own discretion retard the course of democratization and even stop it. The governments of the right-centrist Alliance of the Democratic Center skillfully took advantage of this circumstance in their own class interests. A whole arsenal of means of social control and maneuvering was put into operation for the purpose of imposing the "rules of the game" on leftist forces, forcing them to align themselves with the policies of the authorities and not go beyond "authorized" limits, and spreading reformist illusions among the masses, for example representing the Alliance of the Democratic Center as a party "above classes" which was "giving" democracy to the country, and so forth.

Achieving the goal set was made easier by the circumstance that the transition to bourgeois democracy "from the top" was not accompanied by any radical break and purging of the old political superstructure. Right and ultraright circles linked to the Francoist regime retained strong influence in all the democracy's basic elements; this did not exclude the possibility of attempts of pro-Francoist coups d'etat (several were attempted).

In this complex and deeply contradictory situation, the opinion was widespread among the broad masses of working people that they could fight to consolidate democracy and social progress only by taking moderate and compromising positions. The leading worker organizations believed that radicalization of the slogans of struggle as well as of political actions could arouse a negative class reaction from both the right-centrist and ultraright forces and thereby forcibly interrupt the process of democratization. The tortuous transition from an authoritarian regime to bourgeois democracy, which was filled with obvious and concealed difficulties, led to the democracy becoming idealized and almost considered an end in itself in the consciousness of certain strata of the proletariat. In the political orientation of these working people the struggle for immediate and intermediate goals pushed the socialist future of the worker movement into the background.

The aspiration of the main opposition forces to avoid any political risk or radical experiments in converting to democracy was also explained by an important feature of Spanish political culture. The country's historical past, which was full of military coups d'etat, civil wars, reactionary excesses, and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, led, in certain social groups (especially among influential circles of the ruling class), to the spread of an atmosphere of fanaticism and absolute intolerance toward any unorthodox thinking. The Francoist regime actively encouraged this ideological-psychological stereotype by conducting a policy of dividing the nation into "conquerors" and "vanquished" in the civil war of the 1930's and calling the vanquished republicans, above all the communists, "the worst enemies of the nation" and "Anti-Spain." It is therefore not surprising that 48 percent of those polled in 1983 stated that after Franco's death they

feared the possibility of a new civil war. The breadth of these sentiments is in many respects explained by the fact 65 percent of the people of Spain have relatives who took part in the civil war and 22 percent have relatives who died in it.²

The unique situation in which Spain's worker movement found itself had a constraining influence on the development of the initiative and independence of a large part of the working people, made it difficult to develop a clear-cut class orientation in them, and generated reformist and appeasement sentiments.

However, the most conscious part of the working class did not lose its militant spirit and will to fight in the situation which took shape. These strata of the working people spoke out decisively for countering the restricted reforms of the authorities "from above" with powerful pressure from below in order to strangle the political initiative of the bourgeoisie and change the ratio of forces in the country in favor of the working class.

The new phase in the development of Spain's capitalist economy which accompanied the transition to democracy left a deep mark on the mass sociopolitical consciousness of the proletariat. Its distinguishing features are the transition which began in the production base of Spanish capitalism to an updated technical and technological basis stemming from the country's presumed entry into the Common Market and the introduction of labor-saving equipment as well as the very severe employment crisis that is in part related to it (unemployment in Spain rose from 2.4 percent of the able-bodied population, or 323,000 people, in 1973 to 20.6 percent, or 2.7 million people in 1984; this is the highest figure in Western Europe).³

Both these factors predetermine important changes in the structure of the working class and, correspondingly, in its political orientations. This means primarily the erosion (because of the crisis of a number of traditional sectors) of the industrial nucleus of the proletariat, which is losing its former solidarity, and the rapid increase in the number of engineering-technical personnel and employees of a number of sectors of the services sphere. Moreover, for many people unemployment more and more often becomes a set way of life with the possible negative consequences that entails (severance of social ties, commission of all kinds of antisocial acts, degradation of the individual, and so forth). The number of people in the army of hired labor who are working temporarily or part-time is also increasing. Finally, a special detachment of the proletariat is working people engaged in the sphere of the "underground" economy; this economy is not officially recognized and is formed by large capitalists "decentralizing production and spreading it among small workshops and craftsmen at home who produce finished output or semifinished products from the purchaser's materials (this sector of the economy accounts for up to 25.3 percent of Spain's gross national product). Many working people hired in the sphere of the "underground" economy because of the impossibility of finding work in "legal" spheres of employment are deprived of any legislative protection and are usually subjected to the cruelest exploitation.

Thus, we have growth of centrifugal tendencies in the ranks of the proletariat and progressive isolation of its various strata, which differ sharply from each other in social status and psychological and political orientation.

However, most of Spain's workers unanimously perceived the avalanche-like growth of unemployment as an unexpected natural disaster. In 1981 in answer to the question "What problem is the most important for Spain?" 64 percent of the workers named unemployment. Other crucial problems "gathered" much smaller shares of the votes: terrorism -- 17 percent; price increases -- 7 percent; the energy crisis -- 3 percent; and dissatisfaction with the social system -- 2 percent.⁴ After a period of tangible improvement in material well-being, the fear of losing a job gave many working people a sense of uncertainty, vulnerability, and impotence and made them ready to reconcile themselves to and adapt to everything in order to preserve what had been just achieved. To a significant extent this was exactly what led to growth in reformist trends and competitiveness in the work environment and to the defensive nature of a number of strikes. And although compromising trends did not become absolutely predominant in the mass sociopolitical consciousness of the Spanish working class, a substantial part of the working people made the demand to preserve employment paramount, even at the cost of a loss in wages and renunciation of important socioeconomic and political demands.

An important means of influence on the social consciousness of Spain's working class is the nationality question, which is acutely important to this day, and the related problem of the autonomy of various areas with populations that differ in ethnic composition, language, culture, and traditions. The local bourgeoisie uses the lack of solutions to the problems to instill bourgeois-nationalistic ideology among the proletariat; this often prevents the proletariat from recognizing the class problems of the worker movement and from achieving the unity of action of all working people.

Features of the political course of Spain's leading leftist parties have also had substantial influence on the formation of mass worker consciousness. The role of the communist party was especially important in the stage of transition to democracy when the question of the country's future was essentially being decided.

Nonetheless, in spite of the hopes of the leaders of the PCE [Spanish Communist Party], the implementation of their "new course" was not understood among the broad ranks of the party and its electorate, who criticized party leaders for absolutizing general democratic goals to the detriment of class goals, for unjustified illusions in regard to the large capitalists, and for underestimating the role of mass movements and extraparliamentary actions. At the 11th CPE Congress in December 1983, General Secretary G. Iglesias acknowledged "that recently the party has been experiencing a serious crisis which has been manifested in increased disagreement within the party, a steady decline in its ranks, loss of influence with the masses, and a serious defeat in the parliamentary elections last October." He stated that the party leadership had not been able to make rank-and-file members understand the "concept of Eurocommunism."⁵

All this had a negative impact on the development of the political consciousness of the working people, making it difficult for them to formulate objective ideas of the ratio of social forces in Spain and of real class contradictions.

As for the PSOE line, it is characterized by moderation and caution. This course of the socialist party generally conforms to the image which it has formed in mass consciousness, in particular among reform-minded strata of the proletariat; therefore this course enjoys broad support.

The formation in Spain of the new communist party in January 1984 was a response by part of the working people to the course of the leading leftist parties and a factor of great importance in molding mass sociopolitical consciousness. Its charter says that the party is built on the principles of Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism.⁶

A concrete picture of the political orientations of Spanish workers can be obtained by referring to data from surveys conducted in the late 1970's and early 1980's by Spanish sociologists, most of whom adhered to social-reformist positions (V. Peres Diaz, G.F. Tesanos, and others), as well as public opinion polls. Although this data has serious shortcomings (the population strata it encompasses are limited and bias and situational elements are frequent), in combination with an analysis of the entire experience of the worker movement it gives a certain picture of the processes taking place in the mass sociopolitical consciousness of the proletariat.

The degree of development of the class worldview of the Spanish proletariat, like the proletariat of any other capitalist country, is related in the most direct way to worker recognition of the antagonisms of capitalist society and its place and role in this society. Almost all Spanish working people believe that the society consists of different classes. During a survey conducted in 1980 by a group of sociologists headed by G.F. Tesanos, only 1.2 percent of 1,548 workers from Madrid and its industrial region surveyed stated that classes did not exist in Spain. Nonetheless, in acknowledging the class nature of bourgeois society, many hired employees still do not recognize its internally antagonistic nature and are not able to correctly define their place in society. Thus, a rather substantial part of the working people (36.8 percent) have a false idea of "who they are" -- they consider themselves part of the "middle class." Adhering to this viewpoint are: most people with high monthly incomes which exceed 100,000 pesetas (66.7 percent) and 50,000 pesetas (56.4 percent); more than half the technicians (61.6 percent); employees of automated enterprises (43.8 percent); and brigade foremen (40.3 percent).⁷ Conservatism, political indifference, and religious beliefs are characteristic of the views of this category of hired employees.

A distorted picture of social classes and class antagonism as well as petty bourgeois social origins help spread the ideology of "social partnership" among a significant part of Spanish workers. According to the data of a survey conducted in 1978 by V. Peres Diaz and his associates, of 4,154 people working in small, medium-sized, and large enterprises in all provinces of Spain, 52 percent assumed that they had "interests in common with the owners."⁸ Sixty-seven percent of workers at small enterprises (less than 10 employees)

and 41 percent of workers at large enterprises (more than 1,000 workers) believed that the production rhythm of a capitalist enterprise was "acceptable."⁹

In conditions of economic recession and growing unemployment, the mass sociopolitical consciousness of many working people becomes more disposed to accept the arguments of the state and their patrons concerning the need to surmount difficulties "together." Correspondingly, the ability of the working people independently, without the help of influential class organizations, to orient themselves in an indeterminate and complicated situation also decreases. Thus, in 1978, 50 percent of those surveyed did not deny the truth of the authorities' statements that a labor surplus and increased wages accounted for the financial difficulties of enterprises and increased unemployment; 32.8 percent assumed that many industrialists could not overcome the crisis, to say nothing of making new capital investments, without cutting back on personnel; and 70 percent of the workers believed that the industrialist represented a socially necessary figure without whom the "economy cannot function."¹⁰

The withdrawal of certain groups of workers who held class positions in the years of Francoism from the active struggle against capital and the limitation of their circle of interests to purely material needs and family life is one of the sociopsychological consequences of the crisis. And many working people who were formerly characterized by individualistic and consumer orientations became even more confirmed in them in the crisis period. In response to the question of what is more important in case of conflict in production -- remembering the interests of the family or upholding trade union rights -- approximately three-fourths of those surveyed gave preference to family interests.¹¹

However, studying the dynamics of the mass sociopolitical consciousness of Spanish workers confirms that the process of polarization aggravated by the crisis situation is characteristic of this consciousness. If the crisis has stimulated the growth of moderate and conservative trends in some strata of the proletariat, it has intensified militant oppositionist sentiments in others. Progressive proletarians act as confirmed opponents of capitalist exploitation, stating that their class interests are "irreconcilable with the interests of their patrons." In a survey conducted by V. Peres Diaz, 44.2 percent of the workers expressed this opinion. During G.F. Tesaños's sociological survey mentioned above, 33.3 percent of the workers adhered to a similar viewpoint. In the latter case this means primarily working people with incomes of less than 30,000 pesetas (39.6 percent), those whose workday is 10-11 hours, PCE voters (46.9 percent), and the Trade Union Confederation of Workers Commissions (39.1 percent).¹²

The "polarity" of the workers' perception of their position in the present situation of economic recession and mass unemployment and in addition the discrepancy which frequently arises in these conditions between the consciousness and the behavior of working people is clearly manifested in their attitude toward the strike struggle. According to data from V. Peres Diaz's survey, 77.3 percent of the working people believed that a strike "should be a last resort only after all possibilities of achieving agreement

with industrialists are exhausted." The real social behavior of some of the workers, however, is by no means always the same as their stated opinions; the scope of the strike struggle in Spain attests to this (see Table 1).

Table 1. The Evolution of the Strike Movement

<u>Years</u>	<u>Number of Strikes</u>	<u>Number of Participants</u>	<u>Number of Strike Days</u>
1965	183	59,000	189,000
1975	2,807	504,000	1,815,000
1976	3,662	2,556,000	12,593,000
1977	1,194	2,955,000	16,642,000
1978	1,128	3,864,000	11,551,000
1979	2,680	5,713,000	18,917,000
1980	2,103	2,287,000	6,178,000
1981	2,201	2,006,000	5,155,000
1982	1,965	1,820,000	27,860,000

Sources: "Sovremennaya Ispaniya" [Contemporary Spain], p 100; "Year Book of Labour Statistics," Geneva, 1983, p 764.

The threat of remaining out of work for an indeterminate amount of time, the reduction in real wages, and the rigid, uncompromising position of the patrons which takes advantage of the situation of economic recession to impose its conditions on the working people frequently has the most diverse impact on the consciousness and behavior of Spanish workers, stimulating either social conformism and a respectful attitude toward industrialists and authorities or an active struggle against them through mass collective actions. However, these factors create favorable grounds for a sharp change of mood in the proletarian environment and a rapid shift of the workers from one position to the opposite.

In stimulating the dissimilar behavior of various detachments of the proletariat, the polarization of sociopolitical worker consciousness undoubtedly weakens the force of their opposition to the capitalists. However, the process of the polarization of consciousness by no means excludes a certain degree of unity in other questions among representatives of various ideological-psychological trends in the working class. A sense of their social inequality and oppressed status is characteristic of a large part of the Spanish working people. Thus, 79.4 percent of workers surveyed believe that "only a minority of people really enjoy the fruits of the development of Spain." In the opinion of 50.4 percent of the working people, "being a worker is a thankless job" (44.1 percent do not believe this); 80.5 percent demand the right to participate in making decisions dealing with the direction of production activity, setting wages, and so on.¹³

The results of G.F. Tسانos's sociological survey especially clearly attest to the sharply critical attitude of Spanish workers toward existing ways: 71 percent of the working people said that they "want to replace the present capitalist system with a different one based on other economic and social

principles." Only 11 percent of those surveyed rejected this possibility, another 10 percent stated that "it did not make any difference" to them, and 8 percent did not give an answer. The largest number of adherents of replacing the existing system were among skilled workers, working people with smaller incomes, and the worker youth as well as members of the PCE (89 percent), the PSOE (77 percent), and trade unions (77 percent). The smallest number were from among who consider themselves part of the "middle class."¹⁴

The class reaction of most workers to social oppression is a spontaneous attraction to socialism as a socially just system where everyone is equal. In the opinion of 61.7 percent of workers surveyed, "everything the society produces should be distributed among its members on an equal basis -- to the extent that is possible -- without any large differences." "Socialism, in abolishing the struggle between industrialists and the working people, is a just society in which all people satisfy collective needs together,"¹⁵ 67.2 percent of the workers believe.

Sociological surveys and polls confirm that one of the distinguishing features of mass worker consciousness in Spain is its internal contradiction, instability, and continual changes in the relationships among various trends. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish a predominant position (which may also be partly related to the biased nature of the questions posed) in the responses of both large groups of working people and of individual workers and anticapitalist ideas from the trends of bourgeois, including conservative, ideology.

Thus, a critical attitude toward the existing system and the desire to change it may be characteristic of the same worker who strives for social-partner relations with his boss in production and is oriented to purely material needs in private life. This circumstance, however, attests to the fact that a simplified picture of the social-partner consciousness as a consciousness oriented exclusively to achieving harmony between labor and capital should be avoided. It is much more complex in content. For example, workers who share ideas of social partnership typically crave fairness: fair participation in the distribution of national income, wages, and so on. And this yearning can include both a critical attitude toward the existing system and spontaneous attraction for a more harmonious society. There is a difference of principle between the social-partner ideological constructs of the ruling classes who set the goal of integrating the working class into the existing system and the social-reformist stereotypes of consciousness of some working people which do reflect, though in distorted form, certain positive trends in the working class.¹⁶

Another contradiction of mass worker consciousness is that decisive denunciation of the status quo, widespread yearning to "change the system," and active participation in the strike struggle are often combined with a denial of the need for radical ways and means to carry out fundamental social transformations. The spontaneous anticapitalism engendered by everyday conditions of existence of most working people is oriented to partial reformist changes in the system.

Eighty-five percent of those surveyed believed that social relations should be changed "little by little." Only 10 percent assume that this process should be "rapid and all-embracing."¹⁷

The "fragmented nature" of the mass sociopolitical consciousness of the working class and the frequent presence in it of contradictory and mutually exclusive orientations -- a phenomenon which is generally characteristic of the proletariat of capitalist countries and one that has been thoroughly analyzed by G.G. Diligenskiy¹⁸ -- are very clearly manifested in Spain. The causes of this "fragmented nature" and contradiction -- they are common to the proletariat of capitalist countries (part of the working force's inadequate awareness of the strength of their class, imprecise ideas of ways to implement anticapitalist ideas, inability to synthesize direct production experience with processes in the sphere of large-scale politics which are more remote and complicated to understand, and the orientation to "free enterprise" as the most "rational" model of economic functioning in conditions of today's crisis when it is difficult to understand "where society is going" with the recognition of the need to restrict the arbitrary rule of capitalists) -- are considerably aggravated by the transitional situation which exists in Spain.

An important aspect of the process of the democratization of Spain is the attitude of the working masses toward the democratic system and policies which were only established after Francoism and toward the parties operating in the society.

Democratic values are entering the consciousness of Spanish working people, displacing the authoritarian stereotypes permeated with a spirit of irrationalism and intolerance of unorthodox thinking which were cultivated by Francoism. In response to the question "Which do you prefer -- power belonging to one person who makes decisions for you or a group of people elected by all the citizens who make political decisions?" the overwhelming majority of workers (78 percent)¹⁹ favored the second alternative and only 7 percent favored the first.

Additional evidence of the democratization of mass worker consciousness and the expansion of the sociopolitical horizon of the proletariat is the fundamental weakening of Catholic religious tradition, which has historically played an exceptionally important role in Spain, regulated Spanish people's entire lives -- from birth to death -- and still recently appeared absolutely secure. Although the church is still a powerful force, broad strata of the population are trying to remove it from the secular affairs of life, and are in particular refusing to follow its recommendations on political problems. In 1983 only 8 percent of Spanish people surveyed said that they always followed the political advice of the church.²⁰

However, when the question is raised of evaluating the democratic order which has just been revived in Spain, a note of scepticism and disappointment is clearly heard in workers' responses. The poll conducted at the Madrid Standard Metallurgical Plant graphically illustrates the attitude of progressive detachments of the proletariat to the existing order. The poll showed that most working people regard new democratic values favorably. However, almost half the workers (44.9 percent) do not believe that "with the

coming of democracy they play an important role in the society's life." A large number believe that corruption has not decreased since the establishment of a multiparty system in the country as compared to the period of Francoism (41.2 percent). Along with a predominantly positive evaluation of the parliament's role, dissatisfaction with the new political system and a sceptical attitude toward the role of political parties are expressed. Approximately the same ratio of workers as those who believe that the parties "propose programs which are then not fulfilled" recognize the need for their existence. This viewpoint is characteristic of three-quarters of those surveyed while almost one-third believe that "all parties are the same."²¹

Apoliticalism, which impedes the development of their class consciousness, remains characteristic of a rather substantial number of Spanish working people. In 1981, 48 percent of workers of all categories who were surveyed stated that they were not interested in politics and this figure was highest among unskilled workers (63 percent).²² It is also revealing that in most of the surveys a high percentage of people with "no opinion" was recorded.

The spread of a suspicious and sceptical attitude toward the young democracy and apolitical sentiments among the proletariat are in many respects related both to the dissatisfaction of some working people with the results of the democratization process (in particular in production where frequently, above all at small enterprises, trade unions enjoy limited influence or in general do not operate and the arbitrary rule of the bosses continues, and a corresponding attitude toward the democratic order forms under this influence) and to the shortcomings of mass organizational work by leftist parties and in the matter of eliminating elements of Francoist political culture in the working class, accustoming the masses to large-scale politics, and developing democratic ideals in them, in a word the "teaching" of democracy.²³

Despite the numerous objective and subjective difficulties of forming a new political system, the desire has been preserved in the working class, as in all Spanish society, to develop and intensify the process of democratization. Disappointment with the political course of the CDS [Social Democratic Center] led to the serious defeat which the ruling party suffered in extraordinary parliamentary elections in October 1982. The results of these elections were compared in the Spanish press with a "political earthquake" inasmuch as they were accompanied by a fundamental reorganization of the country's party-political structure as compared with the 1979 elections. And the losses and gains of various parties were often computed in ambiguous figures. Table 2 gives a graphic representation of the regrouping which took place among the main parties [see next page].

The mass reorientation of a substantial part of the electorate (approximately 40 percent of the voters voted for candidates of other parties) is explained by a number of causes.

In the first place, steadily increasing unemployment produces a threat to the very foundations of the existence of different strata of Spanish society. The fear of losing work and status positions stimulates sharply critical evaluations of political parties and an intensified reaction to their nonfulfillment or fulfillment of their own programs. This gives rise to a

Table 2. Changes in the Voting Support and Parliamentary Representation of the Main Parties (1979-1982)

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>PSOE</u>	<u>Popular Alliance</u>	<u>CDS</u>	<u>PCE</u>
1979 Elections	5.5 million	1.1 million	6.3 million	1.9 million
1982 Elections	9.8 million	5.4 million	1.5 million	825,000
Percentage of Votes, 1979	30.5	5.8	34.9	10.8
Percentage of Votes, 1982	46	25.3	7.2	3.8
Seats in Congress of Deputies, 1979	121	168	9	23
Seats in Congress of Deputies, 1982	201	106	12	4
Seats in Senate, 1979	70	3	119	1
Seats in Senate, 1982	134	54	4	--

Source: EL PAIS, 30 October 1982.

favorable sociopsychological climate for the intensive process of reinterpreting traditional values and basic concepts.

Secondly, migrants (primarily rural migrants into the city), who are inclined to change their preferences frequently when they adapt to a new reality, make up a significant part of the party electorate.

Thirdly, in mass sociopolitical consciousness, despite all the costs, the process of assimilating a democratic system of values is taking place. Because of political immaturity, in the first years of democratization many voters evaluated the particular parties based on the leader's personality rather than the party's principles and policies. A marked rise above these simplified notions in the early 1980's and a more informed and political sophisticated citizenry are leading to sharp changes in voter attachments.

Fourthly, Spain's new political system is still far from consolidated; this is expressed, in particular, in the internal reorganization of parties and their adaptation to continually changing conditions. The changes in the appearance of parties and the aggravation of disagreements or, in contrast, the achievement of cohesion which are accompanying these processes evoke a corresponding reaction in mass consciousness.

Fifthly, because of the specific features of the formative period of bourgeois democracy in Spain, polarization has not occurred between the leftist and right parties; therefore the redistribution of votes is very perceptible not only within the two opposition blocs but between them as well. Thus, in the

late 1970's, 20 percent of CDS voters said that they were closer to the PSOE than the right Popular Alliance.²⁴

When analyzing present and future changes in the Spaniards' voting behavior, one more circumstance must be taken into account. Profound upheavals in 20th-century Spain's social development, which were accompanied by continually changing political systems, as well as the "youth" of some basic parties, above all the Popular Alliance and the CDS, predetermine a weakened influence of traditions on forming party preferences.

At the present time approximately 1 out of 2 voters (of 20 million), including most of Spain's worker electorate, vote for the PSOE. The increase in the number of votes received by the socialist party in 1982 as compared to 1979 amounted to 4.3 million. According to data cited by the newspaper EL PAIS, the socialist party received more than 2 million votes of former CDS voters and about a million votes from former CPE voters and votes of people who are left of the CPE, as well as votes of many former non-voters.²⁵ In addition to workers, part of the middle strata and industrialists who did not see a threat to their interests in the socialists' coming to power also voted for the socialists. According to one of the polls, on the eve of the 1982 elections, 30-35 percent of the representatives of the bourgeoisie and urban middle strata said they were prepared to give their votes to the PSOE.²⁶

In this way, the socialist party's political line -- the essence of which is moderate democratic changes combined with the internal cohesion and youth of its leaders, who were not involved in the civil war of the 1930's -- two features which are attractive to voters -- allowed the PSOE to acquire electoral support in various strata of Spanish society. The leaders of the socialist party before and after the elections tried to create an impression of it as the party of the "entire nation" rather than only the working class. However, some of the voters who voted for the PSOE thereby protested against the policies of the CDS and the situation which had taken shape in the country without adopting the socialists' system of ideological values.

For Spanish society, where a fascist regime and an authoritarian political culture held sway not long ago, the coming to power (for the first time in the last 46 years) of the PSOE, which always opposed the dictatorship and is oriented to creating a democratic system of values, is of fundamental significance. The PSOE victory was evidence of the fact that the political atmosphere had changed in Spain: authoritarian and bourgeois-conservative stereotypes of thinking had weakened and new, progressive forms of democratic consciousness were strengthened. It is revealing that the 1982 parliamentary elections occurred against a background of increased citizen political activism. The percentage of non-voters was lower than in any other election in the formative stage of democracy -- 21.3 percent (while in the 1979 parliamentary elections the figure was 33.6 percent).²⁷ After several years of apathy an interest in politics and in building a new, democratic Spain was revived in the society. The CDS's defeat and the transfer of political power to the socialists filled the Spanish people's democratic ideal with new content. However, it would be a mistake to believe that the increased election activism of the masses is a guarantee of future expansion of channels of their influence on the country's political life. The accomplishment of

this goal, which is of enormous significance in "teaching" the masses democracy and consolidating the new political system, will be determined by PSOE policies.

A number of measures carried out by the PSOE government after it came to power (the reduction in the work week from 42 to 40 hours, longer vacations, a ban on holding more than one job, and so on) received a positive response from working people. However, criticism of the government for the continued growth of unemployment, concessions to large capital, and a very ambiguous position on the question of joining NATO²⁸ is increasing in the organized worker movement. The reorganization of industry which was begun by the authorities and is leading to mass firings (according to official data, 60,000 work positions are to be eliminated by 1986, while according to data of the Trade Union Confederation of Workers Commissions the figure is almost 300,000) and is not being accompanied by the creation of alternative work positions is arousing particular dissatisfaction (the previous CDS governments did not set about this seriously). Since early 1984 this government policy has been stimulating the obvious growth of strike activism in Spain. According to data from the Spanish Confederation of Employer Organizations, there were 395 strikes in which 1.9 million working people participated in March 1984 alone. Demonstrations of many thousands of metallurgical workers, ship builders, metal workers, textile workers, and other detachments of the proletariat headed by trade unions, above all the Trade Union Confederation of Workers Commissions, and distinguished by great persistence and tenacity are leading to paralysis of the economic life of entire industrial regions.

The trend noted toward a decline in the popularity of the PSOE was also clearly revealed in the results of April 1984 elections to the autonomous parliament of Catalonia. The nationalist right-centrist coalition, "Convergence and Unity," which got 46.7 percent of the votes and acquired 71 deputy seats carried the day. Only 29 percent of the voters (41 deputy seats) voted for the Socialist Party of Catalonia.²⁹ It is also characteristic that 37 percent of the voters did not come to ballot boxes to vote and a high level of non-voting was recorded in the proletarian regions.

A regrouping of forces took place in the camp of the bourgeois parties of Spain after the 1982 parliamentary elections: the right Popular Alliance (AP) began to play the leading role while the CDS and parties which had split off from it became a minor political force. The AP, however, does not enjoy substantial influence in the working class, since a number of its leaders "recall" the fascist past. In conditions of the crisis of many stereotypes of consciousness which were cultivated by the Francoist dictatorship, the leading bourgeois parties have not been able to work out political-ideological platforms which are attractive to working people.

The transition from a Francoist dictatorship to bourgeois democracy and the new wave of changes which has begun in the economic basis of society and in the structure of the proletariat represent a turning point in the development of the ideological-psychological make-up of the Spanish working class. The process of reorganizing its social consciousness which is being accompanied by the destruction of a number of stereotypes generated by past sociopolitical practices and the formation of a new system of political values has been

expanded. With all the complexity and ambiguity of these changes, on the whole they attest to a leftward shift which has occurred in mass worker consciousness and the weakened influence of conservative bourgeois ideology on it. However, the reorganization which is taking place is leading to the spread of moderate, compromising attitudes among the workers. The contradictory unity of new trends of worker consciousness has been manifested in the working people's mass electoral support of the PSOE which favors further development of the democratization process and at the same time postpones implementation of radical social transformations.

In the 1980's the yearning for the progressive transformation of society is not declining in Spain's working masses. Nonetheless, real progress in this direction depends in many respects on the ability of the leading leftist organizations to activate those elements of proletarian consciousness which "work" on implementing the broad democratization of social life and fundamental social changes.

FOOTNOTES

1. For more detail on the formative process of democracy and the policies of Spain's main parties see the book: "Sovremennaya Ispaniya" [Contemporary Spain], Moscow, 1983.
2. See: CAMBIO-16, No 618, 1983, p 75; *ibid.*, No 619, p 77.
3. See: "La economia espanola en la decada de los 80" [The Spanish Economy in the Decade of the 80's], Madrid, 1982, p 68; EL PAIS, 21 June 1984.
4. Cited from data in: REVISTA ESPANOLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLOGICAS, No 14, 1981, p 203.
5. See: PRAVDA, 16 December 1983.
6. EL PAIS, 14 January 1984.
7. See: SISTEMA, Nos 43-44, 1981, p 100.
8. See: CAMBIO-16, No 403, 1979, p 18.
9. See: REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE SOCIOLOGIA, No 35, 1980, p 469.
10. See: CAMBIO-16, No 403, 1979, pp 17, 18.
11. See: SISTEMA, Nos 43-44, 1981, p 112.
12. See: CAMBIO-16, No 403, 1979, p 18; SISTEMA, Nos 43-44, 1981, p 112.
13. SISTEMA, No 36, 1980, p 79; *ibid.*, Nos 43-44, 1981, p 96; *ibid.*, No 33, 1979, p 92.
14. *Ibid.*, No 41, 1981, p 132.

15. Ibid., No 36, 1980, p 78.
16. For more details on the specifics of social-partnership consciousness see: V.P. Iyerusalimskiy, "The FRG Working Class and the Crisis of the 1970's (Some Aspects of Social Psychology and Mass Consciousness)" in the book "Rabochiy klass v mirovom revolyutsionnom protsesse" [The Working Class in the World Revolutionary Process], Moscow, 1981, pp 93-98.
17. SISTEMA, No 41, 1981, p 132.
18. G.G. Diligenskiy, "The Mass Sociopolitical Consciousness of the Working Class of Capitalist Countries: Problems of Typology and Dynamics" in PK I SM, Nos 1-2, 1984.
19. Cited from data in: REVISTA ESPANOLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLOGICAS, No 16, 1981, p 213.
20. CAMBIO-16, No 630, 1983, p 21.
21. NUESTRA BANDERA, No 105, 1980, pp 29-30.
22. Cited from data in: REVISTA ESPANOLA DE INVESTIGACIONES SOCIOLOGICAS, No 16, 1981, p 224.
23. See: REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLITICOS, No 30, 1982, p 101.
24. REVISTA DE ESTUDIOS POLITICOS, No 23, 1981, p 20.
25. See: EL PAIS, 29 October 1982.
26. CAMBIO-16, No 567, 1982, p 46.
27. See: EL PAIS, 29 October 1982.
28. See, for example: R. Mendeson, "The Policy of Expectation. Who Pays for It?" in PMS, No 11, 1983, pp 79-82.
29. RAZON Y FE, No 1,029, 1984, p 625.

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EVOLUTION OF FRG 'GREENS' PARTY 1980-1984 SURVEYED

Moscow RABOCHIY KLASS I SOVREMENNIY MIR in Russian No 1, Jan-Feb 85 pp 112-125

[Article by Vadim Valer'yevich Dam'ye, graduate student at the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Universal History: "The Ideological-Political Evolution of the 'Greens' in the FRG"]

[Text] A new social movement which calls itself the "green alternative movement" has appeared and is rapidly gathering strength in the political scene of various countries of the capitalist world. It operates under the slogan of creating a new society based on the harmony of man and nature and on a new way of life without alienating man from nature and from other people. In West Germany, the "Greens" have attracted attention primarily through their active demonstrations for peace and the struggle against the deployment of American medium-range missiles. Its participants demand the demilitarization of the FRG and the country's withdrawal from NATO and categorically reject new American medium-range missiles. The "Greens" joined the columns of antiwar and antimissile marches in the spring and fall of 1983, the largest in the country's history. The "Greens" party congress which was held in Duisenburg in November 1983 oriented its supporters to organize "acts of opposition" even to the point of conducting a general political strike.

Not long ago bourgeois politics were denying the "Greens" the right to exist. Nonetheless, they broke into the party-political arena at the start of the 1980's. Some activists of the "green alternative movement" together with representatives of a number of small political groups formed the "Greens" party, whose goal was to supplement the mass movement using the parliamentary forum. In March 1983 this party received 5.6 percent of the votes in federal elections and 27 seats in the West German Bundestag. It ended many years of monopoly by bourgeois parties and social democracy in the parliamentary representation of popular interests and by its mutiny broke up the established political-parliamentary structure. In a congratulatory telegram to the "Green" Party, the German CP described its success as a "moment of common triumph for all democratic and all leftist forces" of the FRG.

But the point, of course, is not only and not so much the election results. The mass nature of "Greens" demonstrations is much more important. The broad extraparliamentary "green alternative movement" did not stop, even after the creation of the "Green" Party. It has become a kind of ideological-political

center of the movement which continues to enlist many hundreds of thousands of people in the antiwar protest and other actions. The growing radicalization and politicization of the movement and its evolution to the left frighten the ruling classes. Bourgeois politicians differ in evaluating the "Green" Party and the "alternative movement" which stands behind it. Sometimes they make scornful comments, other times they try to pull their voters to their side, and other times they call the "Greens" secret communists. Bourgeois and petty bourgeois political scientists get lost in the mysteries of the nature of the "ecological phenomenon." Some see opposition to economic growth in contemporary conditions in it, others -- right populism and "'Green' antirevolution," a movement whose entire program is being exhausted by protest, and so forth.² Sociologists try to draw conclusions on the party's nature on the basis of studying its voter support.³ Most books and articles by non-Marxist authors devoted to various aspects of the "Greens" activity in the FRG are valuable chiefly as sources of factual material.

Scientists of the socialist countries and representatives of communist parties conducted an international scientific seminar on the subject "The Environmental Protection Movement and Communists," organized by the editorial office of the journal PROBLEMY MIRA I SOTSIALIZMA.⁴ The first works devoted to the "Greens" place in FRG life and the various aspects of their ideology and activity have appeared in Soviet historical-political literature.⁵ The first extensive study of the group of new social movements in capitalist countries came out in 1984; it emphasized the achievement of close cooperation between them and communists.⁶ Marxist FRG researchers (V. Gerns, R. Steigerwald, and others) have made a large contribution to analyzing the policies and ideology of the "Greens."⁷

The "Greens" Party and to an increasingly greater extent the movement of the same name already have their own history which merits special study. It is impossible to comprehend the complex ideological-political and organizational structure of the movement and the trends of its development without explaining the place and role of certain constituent parts, their interaction, and the conflict of opposing views and interests. This is also necessary in order to establish the role which the "Green" movement plays or can play in the anticapitalist and antiimperialist struggle which the FRG working class is constantly waging. The "Greens" own materials give a picture of the internal struggle in the "Green" movement.⁸

Research conducted in West Germany in recent years makes it possible to get some idea of the social composition of the movement. Basically, they are representatives of intermediate "new middle strata" ("proletarianizing" intelligentsia, office workers, and students) as well as people working in the nonproduction sphere, trade, and transportation. But in recent years the "Greens" ranks are being replenished more and more from the working class -- especially the unemployed. As far as age is concerned, 60 percent of the "Greens" supporters are less than 30 years of age.⁹

The end of the postwar "economic miracle" and crisis phenomena in the economy which have increased in the FRG since the 1960's hit the middle social strata hard, graphically demonstrating their unstable and dependent position in conditions of state-monopoly capitalism. The first wave of their

demonstrations against capitalist society fell in the second half of the 1960's (the "new left" movement). Participants in nonproletarian protest then came out with the idea of creating "alternative," that is, noncapitalist social relations. In this sense their protest was objectively anticapitalist. It remains so as long as its participants look for a solution to the social crisis in a utopian "third way." In this case the only thing we can speak of is a potential alternative to the capitalist system.

In the early 1970's nonproletarian protest appeared in the form of a number of initially disconnected new social movements which operated independently of each other: the movement to save the environment; the peace movement; the movement for democratic rights; the movement for equal rights for women; the movement for solidarity with developing countries, and so forth. They adopted the rebellious traditions of the "new left" and borrowed from them many methods of forms of struggle, theoretical notions, and ideals.

The fact that one of these movements -- to protect the environment -- became the center of attraction of the protest supporters was no accident. In highly industrialized countries the capitalist economy which is focused on the short-sighted pursuit of profit and spontaneous economic development not governed by the laws of science and the long-term needs of society destroys the living environment. Predatory plundering of resources and the massive production of arms actually threatens life on Earth. Capitalism, which even K. Marx and F. Engels said "leaves a desert behind,"¹⁰ has now led to ecological crisis.

The movement under the slogan of protecting the environment was born in the early 1970's. But an understanding that the roots of the ecological crisis can be eliminated only through changing social relations did not come immediately. Ecological "citizens' initiatives" -- local and regional groups which demonstrated against certain military and industrial sites which destroy the environment -- became the main form of mass protest. The logic of the struggle has more and more pitted their participants against the bourgeois state and the capitalist system of production. Theories of a "noncapitalist alternative" became more and more widespread among environmentalists as awareness of the interconnection between the ecological crisis and capitalism grew. A persistent struggle began between supporters of such views and adherents of partial reforms within the framework of the existing capitalist system.

The first "Green" political party organizations appeared in the FRG in 1976-1978. The social heterogeneity of the movement as well as attempts by various forces to utilize it for their own purposes initially led to the formation of a wide spectrum of small "ecological" groupings: from left-radical and radical-democratic "alternative" (and also "mixed") election slates to extremely conservative groups. The subsequent unification of most of them into the party of the "Greens" was primarily explained by the following considerations: the yearning of certain groups to disseminate their opinions to the entire movement; calculations to achieve better election results, and so on.

The "Greens" Party was created gradually in the FRG in 1979 and was made official at the Constituent Congress in Karlsruhe in January 1980. Given the

acute struggle between conservatives and leftist elements who had joined the party, its program was of a compromise nature. A number of demands of the worker movement were included in it: the need to change existing (capitalist) social relations and create a new social order "without exploiting man and nature"; extensive democratization; protection of the civil liberties and rights of foreign workers; abolition of the practice of "bans on occupations"; and implementation of a policy of peace and disarmament. The inclusion of many of the left wing's demands marked the defeat of the conservative forces. The political isolation of the rightists occurred as a result of the almost 10-year struggle for influence on the ecology movement.

However, the program promoted vague and contradictory demands to stop the growth of the economy which was destroying the environment, break up large enterprises, refuse to use "force" in the struggle for a new society, and others.¹¹ These positions reflected the party's heterogeneous nature.

The adoption of the party program in Saarbruecken in March 1980 opened a new stage in the "Greens" development, while the sharp intensification of crisis phenomena in the economy and policies of the FRG could not help but leave a mark on the party's further ideological-political evolution. The serious economic recession, unemployment, the inefficiency of experimental state-monopoly regulatory measures, the coming to power of the right coalition of the CDU/CSU [Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union] and the FDP [Free Democratic Party] which had undertaken an attack on social rights and gains in the working people's standard of living, and the plans to deploy new American first-strike nuclear weapons in the FRG -- all these factors of the "turn to the right" provoked an intensification of opposition by the working masses.

The problems of unity of action in the antimonopoly struggle and cooperation in the peace and worker movements turned into central themes of debates among the "Greens." During these debates four main political trends arose in the movement. We will examine them starting from the right ones and ending with the leftist ones: conservative-ecological; "Realpolitik," "fundamental opposition," and left-radical ("eco-socialist").

After its defeat at the program congress, the conservative-ecological group remained in mass outside the "Green" Party. Its theoretical sources lie in traditional bourgeois and petty bourgeois concepts unified by the rejection of further growth of the economy and scientific-technical progress which are supposedly causing the ecological crisis. In rehabilitating capitalism as a method of production, this position objectively expressed the interests of various strata of the bourgeoisie and part of the "middle strata."

Such views were most fully stated by the reactionary politician and publicist, H. Gruhl, a former member of the CDU. Relying on the research of a number of ecologists (M. Mesarovich, E. Pestel, and others), he wrote about the threat of a global catastrophe for human civilization as a result of the "excessive" economic and demographic growth which had caused the ecological crisis, the shortage of raw materials, energy, and foodstuffs, unemployment, and the spiritual crisis of mankind. Gruhl advanced a conservative way to get out of the situation: not elimination of the social-political system of capitalism

and not any significant social reforms, but a change in the goals and aspirations of the members of the given society; to do this, in his opinion, it would be enough to support the "general interests" of the people as opposed to class interests, which he declared to be "short-term" interests.¹²

At the present time the "democratic ecology party" formed by Gruhl in 1982 is the center of gravity for his supporters; this party accuses the "Greens" of left extremism. Certain local organizations are close to Gruhl's party: the "Bremen Green List" and the "democratic Greens" in Schleswig-Holstein. The influence of the right "ecologists" is not very great on the scale of the whole country: they received only 11,000 votes in the 1983 general elections.

The "Realpolitik" trend supports creating a new society through basic social reforms. To do this they consider it necessary to actively participate in the real political struggle, including on the parliamentary level. In stating their intention to "take over responsibility," they also pose the question of authority. One of their recognized leaders, the former participant in the "new left" movement, J. Fischer, favors turning the "Greens" into a "leftist ecology party of radical reforms." While acknowledging the tasks of representing the interests of the protest movements and the inevitability of a bitter struggle with the SDPG [Social Democratic Party of Germany], at the same time he appeals for political and parliamentary compromises. It is proposed that agreements on minority support for social-democratic governments be concluded within the framework of these compromises. According to the logic of the radical reformists, the "Greens" will thus manage to prove themselves as the leader of the "reform bloc," attract SDPG and leftist liberal voters to their side, and get the opportunity to formulate conditions for sociopolitical changes in the direction of the demands of the "new socialist movements." In light of this, it is essential to begin with small, partial reforms, concentrating on what is "realistically attainable," rather than on fundamental, basic reforms which the social democrats would not agree to given the present distribution of forces.¹³

The "Realpolitik" grouping is heterogeneous. Along with "new leftists" and "alternative movement" activists who have been disappointed and who consider themselves leftists, completely respectable officials and office workers also side with this group. A grouping of "ecological liberals" which became official at the "Green" Party congress in November 1983 and united various forces and people hostile to the move toward rapprochement with the workers and the broad democratic movement appeared on the right flank of the group. The document prepared by this grouping for the party congress in Karlsruhe (March 1984) rejected attempts of the leftist circle to "combine" ecology with socialism, since, they said, "Ecological politics is only possible as liberal politics." The leader of the "eco-liberals," E. Hoplichek, appealed to the "Greens" to confine themselves to the political role of the "new Free Democratic Party" and study the possibility of cooperation and coalition not only with social democrats, but with the CDU/CSU.¹⁴ The grouping favors the independence of parliamentary factions from party control and converting the "Greens" into an ordinary bourgeois-reformist party, isolated from the mass movement.

The "fundamental opposition" group, which is quite mixed in its political nature and the views of its members, stands for rejecting the struggle for partial reforms or direct improvement of the working people's situation within the confines of the existing capitalist society. Instead of this, they propose the creation, parallel to this society, of a new, "ecological" social stratum to supplant the capitalist one. The "fundamentalists" reject political agreements and compromises with other parties, among them the SDPG, which does not differ fundamentally from the CDU in their opinion. They also reject active parliamentary activity.

In the opinion of one of these theoreticians, R. Bahro, in contemporary conditions of "industrialized society," "external" contradictions with respect to capitalist society (between the East and the West, between the North and the South, and between man and nature) rather than "internal" socioeconomic, class contradictions are paramount. Social revolution must be accomplished by a "new historical bloc," in which he includes not only working people but certain representatives of the bourgeoisie as well, rather than by a class. This bloc must gradually, through "reforms of revolutionary content" rather than using revolutionary demonstrations, wrest supremacy from the "bloc which is in power" and also enlist on their side conservative strata which support the CDU/CSU. The "Green" Party must not be either right or leftist but "ecological": instead of participating in the struggle of leftist and right forces within the framework of capitalist society, it should "leave" this society and make a "complete break with capitalism," not in a revolutionary way but through the development of "social alternatives" (the "alternative movement" and "alternative enterprises"). Instead of expropriating the means of production from private owners, it demands achieving a "reorganization of civilization" and the creation of a "postindustrial way of life" with an economy based on simple production and reproduction and small self-governing "social units."¹⁵

The "fundamentalists" generally prefer not to pose the question of political power but assume that their goals can be achieved through combining accelerated development of an "alternative" economy with mass nonviolent "direct actions." According to their ideas, the development of an "alternative" movement in the economic sphere will undermine the supremacy of the monopolies. The "fundamentalists" assert that two sectors -- the "formal," in which they include capitalist and state-capitalist enterprises and the "informal" (the so-called alternative enterprises -- cooperative groups and companies, "self-help" and "neighborly help" organizations, small decentralized cooperative enterprises, and planning organizations and services which arose in the 1970's belong here) -- presently operate in the FRG economy. In the "informal" sector they see the germ of a future just society where capitalist relations and the buying and selling of labor supposedly do not exist. The "fundamentalists" propose developing this sector within the framework of a "dualistic economy," enlisting the unemployed and young people in it, and gradually supplanting capitalist monopolies.¹⁶ Of course, these plans are illusory since given the supremacy of economically more powerful monopolies and capitalist market relations, in the long-term perspective "alternative enterprises" will not be able to endure the competition with large capitalist industry.

The most influential part of the "fundamentalists," headed by one of the "Green" Party organizers and its former co-chairman P. Kelly, understand that just development of the "informal sector" will not succeed in achieving changed social relations and that development of the mass movement must be paramount. P. Kelly pointed out that the "antiparty" which heads the "alternative movement" must master all the forms of nonviolent opposition (the occupation of enterprises and buildings, sit-down strikes, blocking roads, and so forth); and "nonviolence and nonviolent direct action as a method are the highest precept and the basic, immutable principle."¹⁷ But it remains unclear how such nonviolent protest can lead to the creation of a new political order in the FRG. There is a realistic feature in these views -- a withdrawal from blind faith in parliamentarianism and the parliamentary struggle (P. Kelly considers it one of the possible but not primary methods of struggle). Nonviolent demonstration and protest actions are considered an important means of mobilizing the masses.

There are also ultraleftist groups of "autonomists" in the "fundamental opposition": some participants of the movement of apartment tenants who occupy empty buildings (squatters); representatives of various local initiatives and youth organizations, and so forth. They have not joined the "Green" Party en masse, rejecting the party form of organization and parliamentary activity. Charges against the party of giving up the revolutionary struggle and a tendency to compromise are often heard from their ranks.¹⁸ A small number of the ultraleft "fundamentalists" operate, nonetheless, within the "Green" Party, making up minority groups in the Hamburg and Hessen organizations for example. They consider parliamentary work exclusively as a means to expose the policies of the ruling classes, reject cooperation with social democrats even on practical issues, claim to be the sole representatives of leftist forces, and insist on socialization of the means of production.

The overall attitude of most adherents of "fundamental opposition" to the idea of joint struggle by the "Green" movement and the FRG working class is negative. They propose an orientation to the conservative strata of the population and giving up the struggle against unemployment. In their opinion, people who have lost their jobs should leave the "system of production" and run "parallel to it" (in the "informal sector") until capitalism collapses under the pressure of 5 million unemployed and power automatically passes to the "Greens." Even the bourgeois press describes these positions as a harmful illusion. Others recognize the need to act together with the working class but they reject the possibility of joint actions with the SDPG or reformist trade unions. Considering the worker movement a potential ally of the ecology movement, they demand that the working class subordinate their goals to the goal of the survival of mankind. They say the "ecological revolution" will also liberate the working class by creating an "association of independent producers" through decentralization of the economy, by insuring full employment, and by eliminating exploitation and alienation.

At the party congress in Sindelfingen January 1983 where the "Greens" socioeconomic program was discussed before elections to the Bundestag, the "fundamentalists" introduced a number of amendments to the draft which envisioned cooperation with the worker movement. At their insistence formulations on the "worldwide capitalist economy" and competition as causes

of the "crisis of capitalist industrial society" were voted down. The congress adopted the compromise wording proposed by the "Green" organization of North Rhine-Westphalia which emphasized criticizing "today's industrial society" and contained demands for its partial replacement and reorganization and the elimination of large industry. The leader of the Baden-Wuerttemberg state organization and member of the production council, V. Hoss, stated: "We must question the role of the working class and its consumer habits. And furthermore, the workers must learn abstinence."¹⁹

The left-radical group in the "Green" movement, which favors combining ecological principles with "new left" concepts of socialism, has received the name "eco-socialist" in the West German press. Hamburg is the main bulwark of the trend but its adherents also operate in other state organizations of the "Greens."

The left-radical trend, which included some of the "new leftists" and ex-members of the ultraleftist so-called K-groups (the Zet Group from the "Communist Alliance" and many former members of the Maoist "Communist Party of Germany") has attracted a substantial number of young "Green" activists -- workers, unemployed, members of production councils, and students. These elements, which continued the late 1960's tradition of extraparlimentary opposition, have gradually converged with the "Green" movement. On the one hand, changes in the convictions of rank-and-file participants in new social movements and on the other, the search by left-radical forces for more realistic forms and methods of struggle account for this. Unsuccessful attempts to create left-socialist organizations and the sectarian fate of the "K-groups" have brought the idea of an alliance with ecologists to life. The left radicals were at first in the minority both as a new party and among the participants in the movement on the whole. Nonetheless, their influence began to increase as the "Greens" popularity among young unemployed, students, and workers increased. At the party congress in Hagen (November 1982) they won a remarkable victory: the "eco-socialists" candidate R. Trampert, a member of the production council from Hamburg, was elected one of three co-chairmen of the party in 1982-1984. The left radicals also received a majority in the "Green" Party higher organs in the period between congresses -- on the Federal Governing Board and the Federal Committee.

The views of the left-radical wing of the "Greens" are reflected, in particular, in the program of the Hamburg "Green Alternative Slate" organization. The cause of the ecological and economic crisis, it points out, is the "capitalist market economy." It is to be replaced by a planned economy based on the cooperation of working people -- producers and consumers. The socialization of production and the introduction of a system of self-government of working people is declared the long-term goal.²⁰ It is emphasized, however, that the "ecological, socialist society" being created in this way must have nothing in common with real socialism.

The left radicals, in the words of their Hamburg leader, T. Ebermann, have adopted a line of the "dialectics of reform and revolution." They believe that "the shortcomings against which the political struggle must be conducted are a result of the system and. . . are to be eliminated only together with it." But at the same time they strive "to achieve at least a small political

success in actual everyday politics: permanent social reform as a path toward a new society."²¹ Insofar as it is possible to understand from such vague statements, the point is, in gradually increasing the masses' pressure on the capitalist state and focusing demonstrations initially on particular tasks, to undermine widespread reformist illusions on the one hand and, on the other, to wring concession after concession from the ruling class and shatter the capitalist order. Parallel with this, it is proposed to encourage the creation of unique "counterauthority" organs (for example, councils at enterprises seized by labor collectives or squatter committees).

Such a strategy fits poorly with the proclamation in the "Green" Party program of the principle of "nonuse of violence." It is no accident that this point, which is basic for most party members, is absent in the program of the Hamburg "Green Alternative Slate."

The attitude toward the parliamentary struggle, political compromises, and the SDPG is closely related to the question of paths toward a new society. The left radicals consider participation in parliaments as merely representation of the interests of the mass extraparliamentary movement. In this way their position is close to the point of view of the "fundamentalists," although they recognize the need for political compromises and limited, purely tactical cooperation with the SDPG. The left radicals consider the CDU/CSU and the right government the main enemy. In an interview in the journal DER SPIEGEL, R. Trampert characterized the SDPG as "bourgeois" in party essence and spoke critically of the "historical experience" of social democracy, but rejected the "fundamentalists'" opinion that the SDPG in no way differs from the CDU. In his opinion, the "Greens" must be ready to support the social democrats in certain conditions.²²

These conditions were formulated by proposal of the left radicals at the congresses in Hagen in 1982 and in Sindelfingen in January 1983 and combine ecological and democratic demands: unconditional opposition to the atomic program and construction of atomic power plants, deployment of chemical and atomic weapons, and American cruise missiles and Pershing-2 missiles in the FRG; negotiations on measures to save forests and halt the construction of projects which destroy the environment (landing strips at the Frankfurt Airport, the Rhine-Main-Danube canal, and others); protection of democratic freedoms; equal rights for women, and so on.

The left radicals see the "Greens'" future in cooperation with the worker movement through participation in trade union and production council work in order to surmount the policy of "social partnership." In light of this an important place is given to the need for joint struggle against unemployment. During debates on the party's socioeconomic program at the congress in Sindelfingen, by the initiative of the left radicals, the position on "cooperation of hired labor with trade union and social organizations" and the support of "trade union work which makes the problem of where and for what reason to produce paramount" was secured.²³ For this purpose, a number of demands promoted earlier by the West German working class were included in the election platform: the introduction of a 35-hour work week; the creation of new work positions in sectors which do not harm the environment; progressive changes in the tax system; reduction of the military budget; and establishment

of democratic control over banks and concerns. In the long-term perspective, radical social transformations must follow: the replacement of capitalist relations of ownership of land and mineral resources, natural wealth, means of production, and banks by "new social forms of ownership" based on the self-government of working people (but without converting them into state property); the elimination of alienation of labor and social relations; the transformation of the hired labor system into "democratic and socially controlled" production oriented to people's vital needs; and elimination of the opposition of mental and physical labor.²⁴ The social organization "Members of Trade Unions for the 'Greens'" was created in February 1983 in support of the course mentioned and the group "'Greens' and Trade Unions" arose in late October 1983.

The left radicals contrast the path of noncapitalist social transformations in cooperation with the worker movement to both the "fundamentalist opposition" and "Realpolitik" lines. However, they consider preserving the unity of "Green" ranks a major prerequisite of their viability.

The left radical wing considers the development of the organizational principle of "basic democracy" a condition for strengthening the party. This means decentralizing the decision-making process and constant control by the "base" (members and supporters of the party and party election organs) of the activities of all "Green" officials and representatives. Implementation of "rotation" -- replacing all officials in the party 2 years after they assume their posts -- is considered one of the main measures in this direction. In order to prevent the "Greens" from growing into a reformist-parliamentary group, at the congress in Sindelfingen adherents of the left radical wing managed to adopt a decision on "rotation" for party representatives in the Bundestag as well, although this really contradicts established parliamentary norms. For this reason their faction includes, in addition to the representatives, their deputies -- the people who are to replace the representatives after 2 years. Extension of the term is allowed only with the approval of four-fifths of the state party organization. The operation of the principle of "imperative mandate" has been extended to the "Green" representatives of the higher legislative organ: they are obliged to implement the party's decisions, give regular reports to its organs and the member body, and continue work with the mass extraparlimentary movement. The congress obliged party representatives in the Bundestag to pay about five-sixths of the representative salary into the party fund (they must not receive more than the average pay of a skilled worker).²⁵

In the left radicals' opinion, the organizational principles of "basic democracy" must be spread to all West German society, initially combining them in one form or another with the parliamentary system, but in the future converting to a "society of self-government." In conducting an active struggle for democratization, they favor unlimited freedom of demonstrations and strikes and an end to the practice of "banning occupations" and are against arrests and persecution of progressive forces. They support women's rights and social and national minorities and demand that participants in antiwar and antinuclear demonstrations who were convicted be freed and the activity of neofascist organizations be prohibited.

The left radical group attaches paramount significance to the struggle for peace and against the threat of war and the growing militarization of the FRG, taking a more progressive position on these issues than the party as a whole. While sharing in one form or another the ideas of the "equal responsibility of the superpowers," which is widespread among most "Greens," this group more consistently condemns American imperialism. Thus, the program of the Hamburg "Greens" notes that "at the present time the expansionist policies of the United States are the main threat to peace."²⁶ Considering themselves a spokesman for the interests of the peace movement, the left radicals reject any possibility of compromise on the question of deployment of NATO missiles. They have spoken out in support of Soviet proposals for negotiations on reducing nuclear medium-range weapons in Europe and blamed the American side for their failure.

The left radicals pit their slogan -- peace without arms -- against the arms race and NATO militarism. They demand that nuclear, chemical, and bacteriological means of mass destruction be liquidated, military blocs be disbanded, American Pershing-2 and cruise missiles be removed, the FRG withdraw from NATO, and the country be demilitarized. In addition, some of them hold traditional pacifist views, insisting that every side refuse to use arms and promoting the slogan of "social opposition" (the rejection of cooperation with the aggressor, civil disobedience, and so forth).

The left radical group follows a more clear-cut anticapitalist line than most "Greens."²⁷ A number of its slogans go beyond the framework of the bourgeois order. Although the left radicals' ideas on the future society and paths toward it are vague and contradictory, they reflect the viewpoint of that part of the "Greens" which has recognized the causal connection between capitalism and the ecological crisis and favors socialization of the means of production and cooperation with the FRG worker movement.

The process of formation of the main intraparty groups and groupings of "Greens" took place from 1980-1983. The 1983 elections to the West German Bundestag and the nation-wide struggle which developed to prevent the deployment of NATO missiles on the country's territory were the first serious tests of the party. A whole complex of new problems which the "Greens" confronted caused the intraparty struggle to intensify. A regrouping of forces occurred in 1983-1984. The "fundamental opposition," which had earlier set the tone and then lost its positions in party leadership, retreated into the background. It is characteristic that beginning in November 1982, ardent "fundamentalists" could not manage to get the support of most representatives to party congresses. However, the party's success in parliamentary elections and the formation of a "Green" faction in the Bundestag led to a certain increase in reformist illusions, and the "Realpolitik" supporters gained strength on this wave.

The representatives of this reformist group waged a struggle for more active utilization of parliamentary possibilities and rapprochement with the social democrats. However, its attempts to impede the party's evolution to the left and its adoption of more radical decisions encountered opposition from left radicals supported by the Federal Governing Board and from "fundamentalists."

The intraparty struggle took its most acute forms in the Baden-Wuerttemberg and Hessen state organizations.

The "Green" Party Baden-Wuerttemberg organization has always been considered one of the most conservative. Its program, ratified in 1980, did not contain anticapitalist positions (on socializing the means of production, for example); the local branch of the party remained the only one which rejected the "rotation" of representatives for a number of years. The "Green" faction in the Landtag even cooperated with the CDU on certain questions. Changes occurred in January 1983 when the state congress condemned this policy. Later the new leaders of the organization spoke out in favor of "rotation" of representatives. The Baden-Wuerttemberg "eco-liberals" suffered yet another serious defeat at the state party congress in November 1983. The bloc of "eco-socialist" and "fundamental-opposition" elements which had been formed managed to ratify a radical program for elections to the Landtag in March 1984. For example, it envisions "elimination of private control over the means of production" in stages and the creation of a "socially organized" economy based on the self-government of working people. It puts forward a demand for a 35-hour work week; the need for cooperation with trade unions is proclaimed. At the same time, the demand to subdivide "giant" enterprises has been repeated.²⁸ Nonetheless, the representatives chosen in elections to the Landtag belonged to the "Realpolitik" group. Acute disagreements in regard to the political course have continued between the Baden-Wuerttemberg party leadership and the faction.

Events in Hessen acquired a unique character; not one party received an absolute majority in the 1982 and 1983 state elections and in order to form a stable government the social democrats had to support the "Greens." Adherents of the "fundamentalists," who had earlier comprised the majority in the Hessen organization, either objected in principle to negotiations with the SDPG or proposed conducting them for the exclusive purpose of exposing their policies. Followers of the "Realpolitik" line managed to conduct negotiations with the social democratic prime minister V. Boerner in order to achieve agreement on cooperation during the entire 4-year term of the legislature. During several rounds of consultations agreement was achieved as to positions on the main points discussed. The "Greens" made significant concessions: for practical purposes they withdrew their demand to stop the construction of a new runway at the Frankfurt airport, which is a firm demand of the participants in the mass movement, agreed to keeping the AES's which had already been built, and renounced their demands to eliminate the political police ("the department to protect the constitution") and substantially expand the rights of foreign workers.

The major concessions of the Hessen leaders forced the left radical majority of the Federal Governing Board of the "Green" Party to intervene. Rejecting the "fundamentalists'" appeals to refuse any negotiations with the social democrats, at the same time it considered the results achieved in Hessen unsatisfactory and spoke out for conducting a new dialogue with the SDPG. Since according to the principles of "basis democracy," the decisions of the federal organs are only recommendations for state organizations, the Federal Governing Board appealed by letter to the Hessen "Greens." The letter pointed out that conducting negotiations with the SDPG on "tolerance" was in principle

correct, but any such agreement must envision the start of decisive social changes. The board emphasized that the "Greens" must not become the junior partner of the SDPG.²⁹

A special state congress was held in the Hessen city of Usingen in January 1984. Considering the importance of the forum, R. Trampert and T. Ebermann took part in its work. After stormy debates the "Realpolitik" supporters managed to obtain the support of two-thirds of the delegates. Despite the position of the federal party leadership, the resolution adopted generally approved the results achieved in negotiations. The faction was charged with continuing consultations with the social democrats in order to achieve a final agreement. It was to support the draft budget introduced by the SDPG and cooperate with it in the Landtag.³⁰

In June 1984 the Hessen "Green" representatives voted for the social democratic prime minister and his governmental program. But the alliance of the Hessen "Greens" with the social democrats lasted only until the end of 1984.

The internal struggle in the "Green" Party was conducted not only on the state level but on the federal level as well. Forces which opposed the left radical leadership of the party also tried to achieve a review of certain organizational principles of the "Greens." Although the faction in the Bundestag (officially called the "group of 'Greens' in the Bundestag") for the most part operates successfully and uses the parliamentary forum both to expose the policies of the ruling Bonn coalition and to explain the demands of mass social movements, the discord and struggle of trends which are characteristic of the party are reflected in its activities. Some representatives who are affiliated both with the supporters of "Realpolitik" (J. Fischer) and with the "fundamental-opposition" forces (P. Kelly) have come out for a substantially relaxation of control over the faction's activities.

Along with disagreements on organizational questions in the party and the parliamentary faction, contradictions have begun to appear in the approach to foreign policy problems as well. They became especially intense after the failure of attempts to prevent the deployment of American missiles. At the party congress in Duisburg in November 1983 demands to leave the peace movement because it was supposedly governed by the communists resounded from the ranks of the "fundamentalists." At the faction's meeting in January 1984 J. Fischer practically questioned the need for solidarity with the struggle of peoples in Central America. One of the most serious intraparty crises broke out in the same month: former Bundeswehr General G. Bastian, who was elected to the Bundestag on the "Greens" slates and had earlier proven himself an active participant in the struggle for peace, spoke out in a letter which attacked the party's entire political line. He asserted that the "Greens" course was determined by ultraleftists from the "K-groups" who had gained access to leadership posts and perverted the movement's goals, rejected "nonviolence," and were conducting a one-sided foreign policy. He also criticized "rotation" and the practice of party control.³¹ In February 1984 G. Bastian left the faction and then he and P. Kelly removed their signatures from the Krefeld Appeal directed against the deployment of American missiles. G. Bastian's actions intensified intraparty polemics. They caused serious

danger for the "Greens" had only to lose another two mandates in the Bundestag to be deprived of the status of faction. The "Bastian affair" did not reduce the "Greens'" activism in the peace struggle. All three of its co-chairmen were replaced in the spring of 1984 in order to consolidate the faction.

Problems of protecting the environment (in particular the destruction of forests) as well as opposition to the further militarization of the country (voting against extending the period of military service and increasing the military budget) occupy a fundamental place in the faction's activities. In the social sphere the "Greens" have supported demands for a 35-hour work week and to ban labor lockouts, expand the rights of production councils at enterprises, and support the initiatives of the unemployed. They consistently support protecting democratic rights and expose the connection of the FRG ruling circles with monopolies, which was particularly seen in the "Flicka affair."

Fundamental difficulties remain on the path of the "Greens'" cooperation with the worker movement. Despite its weaknesses, the program adopted in Sindelfingen can be characterized as a sign of the "Greens" continuing turn toward possible joint actions with trade unions and the worker movement as a whole³²; nonetheless, both the sectarian line of the "Greens" and their devotion to utopian ideas, and the political course of a large part of the trade union leadership of West Germany impede this cooperation. Nevertheless, the number of members of production councils and officials who support the "Greens" is growing steadily, especially in those cases where the "Greens" occupy progressive positions. Nonetheless, as yet only the first steps have been made. Leftist trade union figures and the German CP actively support rapprochement.

Disagreements on many questions of worldview and tactics exist between the FRG communists and the "Greens." In spite of this, the German CP supports cooperation with participants in the new social movements. At the 7th Congress in January 1984 the chairman of the German CP, H. Mies, stated that the party of the FRG working class will henceforth fight for an alliance with the "Greens": "And no matter how sharply or fundamentally we argue on basic political questions and on forms of action, in this we will always give preference to joint interests."³³

An analysis of the struggle of the different ideological-political groups in the "Green" movement in the FRG makes it possible to identify several main trends of its evolution. Above all, the conservative grouping which tried to subordinate the "Greens" to the interests of monopoly capital suffered defeat and thereby the objectively anticapitalist orientation of the movement was consolidated. In 1982-1983 the left radical wing managed to increase its influence and achieve a majority in the party's ruling organs. Nonetheless, most of the participants in the "Green" movement adhere to radical democratic views rather than socialist views. The "Greens'" successes in the 1983 elections to the Bundestag as well as the local and state elections which followed them and elections to the European parliament confirmed their increased political influence. But they also had negative aspects which have led to increased parliamentary illusions. Forces which work in the direction

of weakening its dependence on the mass extraparliamentary protest movement are being activated in the party.

The instability of the ratio of forces in the "Green" Party was confirmed at its recent 7th Congress in Hamburg (December 1984). The "Realpolitik" supporters managed for the first time to elect two of their candidates to the Federal Governing Board and vote down the draft of a resolution on cooperation with the SDPG proposed by the leadership. Instead of this, a compromise draft was adopted which essentially leaves the question open on the federal level and on the local level leaves it to the discretion of the local organizations. However, the "eco-socialist" R. Trampert was reelected co-chairman of the party. The results of the congress make it possible to evaluate the ratio of forces in the "Green" Party as unstable equilibrium.

Thus, a certain movement to the left is taking place in the "Green" movement although this process is inconsistent and contradictory. At the present time, when solidifying broad democratic forces in the struggle against the reactionary course of the SDU/CSU and the SDPG coalition has become the paramount task, the radicalization of this movement plays an important role in the country's political life.

FOOTNOTES

1. See: UNSERE ZEIT, 8 March 1983.
2. See, for example: C. Amery, "The Philosophical Foundations" in "Die Gruenen: Personen, Projekte, Programme" [The Greens: People, Plans, Program], Stuttgart-Degerloch, 1980; "Sozialliberalismus oder rechter Populismus?" [Social Liberalism or Right Populism?], Berlin, 1980; H. Tallert, "Eine gruene Gegenrevolution" [A Green Counterrevolution], Frankfurt am Main, etc., 1980, and others.
3. See, for example: H.-D. Roensch, "Green Slates," in "Buergerinitiativen in der Gesellschaft" [Citizens' Initiatives in Society], Villingen, 1980; same author, "The Greens: The Voter Base" in GEWERKSCHAFTLICHE MONATSHEFTE, No 2, 1983, and others.
4. See: PMS, No 3, No 5, 1981.
5. See: B.M. Maklyarskiy, "The Movement to Protect the Environment: New Frontiers," in RK I SM, No 5, 1982; L. Istyagin, "The 'Green' Party in the Political Landscape of the FRG," in MEMO, No 2, 1983; L.I. Vasilenko, "Anthropocentrism and Its Ecological Criticism" in VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 6, 1983; A.S. Pokh and A.B. Trukhan, "The Green Party in the FRG Political Arena" in RK I SM, No 3, 1984; Yu. Krasin and B. Leybzon, "Communists and the New Social Protest Movements" in KOMMUNIST, No 5, 1984; A.F. Khramtsov, "The FRG: The Increasing Role of the Working Class in the Contemporary Antiwar Movement in RK I SM, No 6, 1984.

6. See: "Ne sopernichestvo, a sotrudnichestvo! Kommunisty i novoye v sotsial'nykh dvizheniyakh" [Not Rivalry But Cooperation! Communists and the New in Social Movements], under the editorship of Yu.A. Krasin, Moscow, 1984.
7. V. Gerns, "The Antimonopoly Potential of New Social Movements" in KOMMUNIST, No 11, 1983; R. Steigerwald, "Marxism and Contemporary Times: The Debate Concerning the Problem of Humanism" in VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 10, 1983; M. Bur and R. Steigerwald, "Otrecheniye ot progressa, istorii, poznaniya, i istiny" [The Repudiation of Progress, History, Knowledge, and Truth], Moscow, 1984; R. Steigerwald, "Protestbewegung: Streitfragen und Gemeinsamkeiten" [The Protest Movement: Issues and Common Interests], Frankfurt-am-Main, 1982; IMSF. INFORMATIONSDOKUMENT NR 37, Frankfurt-am-Main, 1983.
8. H. Gruhl, "Ein Planet wird gepluendert" [A Planet Will Be Plundered], Frankfurt-am-Main, 1975; "Die Gruenen: Personen, Projekte, Programme" [The Greens: People, Plans, Program], Stuttgart-Degerloch, 1980; R. Bahro, "Elemente einer neuen Politik" [Elements of a New Politics], Berlin, 1980; P.K. Kelly, "We Are the Antiparty-Party" in DER SPIEGEL, No 24, 1982; R. Trampert, "The Mirror -- A Discussion" in DER SPIEGEL, No 8, 1983; "Was sollen die Gruenen im Parlament?" [What Should the Greens Do in Parliament?], Frankfurt-am-Main, 1983.
9. CAPITAL, No 9, 1982, p 111.
10. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 32, p 45.
11. See: "Die Gruenen. Das Bundesprogramm" [The Greens: The Federal Program], Bonn, 1980.
12. See: H. Gruhl, "Ein Planet. . ." op.cit. fn 8; same author, "The Green Urgency; The Green Manifesto" in "Der Gruene Protest" [The Green Protest], Frankfurt-am-Main, 1978.
13. See: J. Fischer, "For a Green Radical Reform" in "Was sollen die Gruenen im Parlament?" op. cit. fn. 8, pp 35-46.
14. See: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 3 March 1984.
15. R. Bahro, "Elemente einer neuen Politik," op. cit.; same author, "Wahnsinn mit Methode" [Madness with a Method], Bonn, 1982.
16. See: N. Nacken and A. Soergel, "Out of Crisis with the Dual Economy?" in MARXISTISCHE BLAETTER, No 3, 1983, pp 23-24.
17. P.K. Kelly, "The Green Party" in "Die Gruenen: Personen..." op. cit. fn 2, p 79.
18. See, for example: "The Green Cells of West Berlin. The Reversal of Themes" in "Was sollen. . ." op. cit. fn 8, pp 47-55.

19. Quoted from: MARXISTISCHE BLAETTER, No 2, 1983, pp 102-103; No 3, pp 18-20.
20. See: "Gruen-Alternative Liste. Programm fur Hamburg" [The Green Alternative Slate. Program for Hamburg], Hamburg, 1982, pp 11-12.
21. T. Ebermann, "Who Is Now Disseminating the Real Parliamentary Illusions?" in "Was sollen..." op. cit. fn 8, p 145.
22. See: DER SPIEGEL, No 3, 1983.
23. "Die Gruenen. Sinnvoll arbeiten -- solidarisch leben. Sofortprogramm gegen Arbeitslosigkeit und Sozialabbau" [The Greens. To Work Significantly -- To Live in Solidarity. An Emergency Program Against Unemployment and Social Degeneration], Cologne, 1983, pp 11, 21, and others.
24. See: Ibid.
25. See: VORWAERTS, 20 January 1983, 27 January 1983.
26. "GAL. Programm fur Hamburg" [GAL. Program for Hamburg], p 5.
27. See: MARXISTISCHE BLAETTER, No 3, 1983, p 18.
28. See: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 4 January 1984.
29. See: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 12 January 1984.
30. See: DIE GRUENEN, 21 January 1984, p 3.
31. See: FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE, 13 January 1984.
32. MARXISTISCHE BLAETTER, No 3, 1983, p 18.
33. Quoted from: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND, 7/8 January 1984.

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1980'S W. EUROPEAN 'LEFT-EXTREMISM' LINKED TO 1970'S TERRORISM

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[Article by Kseniya Grigor'yevna Myalo, candidate of historical sciences and scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences IMRD [Institute of the International Worker Movement]: "Left-Extremist Groupings in Countries of Western Europe: The Ideological and Social-Psychological Genesis"]

[Text] In the 1970's, under cover of left-extremist slogans, terrorism appeared on the political stage in some European capitalist countries and rapidly took on very provocative and ugly forms. The peak of its disturbing influence on social consciousness was achieved in the spring of 1978 in connection with the kidnapping and murder of Aldo Moro.

Nonetheless, despite the years that have passed since then, the problem has not become obsolete even now. Moreover, while some of the most gloomy prognoses of 1978 were not confirmed, the event nevertheless revealed great instability and began to be incorporated rapidly and quite firmly in the sociopolitical structure of contemporary bourgeois society. This fact in itself can cause great concern and demands constant vigilance, which, among others, the communists of Italy and of a number of other states continually emphasize. Thus, back in the fall of 1980 the daily RINASHITA wrote: "Terrorists groups have experienced sensitive blows themselves; they are far from destroyed and still have the dangerous ability to act and the opportunity to hit state institutions hard; this makes great vigilance on the part of the democratic community necessary. . . ." The phenomenon is not only and not peculiarly Italian. The political leaders of Western European countries and bourgeois researchers who perceived the manifestation of some serious organic disease in Western bourgeois civilization in the rapid development and dissemination of terrorism have repeatedly pointed this out.

It is true that in the early 1980's in connection with a propaganda campaign on this issue launched by the most reactionary circles, the accent was displaced and attention to profound sociopolitical factors of the origin of terrorism and its spiritual-ideological roots was weakened. Soviet researchers published a number of very interesting, informative works which revealed the ties of terrorist groupings with sabotage and intelligence centers of the imperialist states.¹ Needless to say, the significance of these aspects of the problem should not be disputed.

Nonetheless, as the the newspaper LA PAESE SERA wrote relatively recently, in order to successfully fight against terrorism, an attempt should be made to understand "the intellectual climate which encouraged the birth of the insane theory of an armed party."²

The author of the present article makes this kind of attempt, focusing her attention mainly on the ties of the very persistent and far from new spiritual-psychological extremist complex with the phenomenon of leftist terrorism of the 1970's in the FRG and Italy.

In January 1983 when the trial was over and the verdict was announced in the "Moro case," the time came for a definitive summary of the results. The former minister of the interior, Rognoni, recalled the events of 5 years earlier and the shock of the citizens and impotence of the government: "A wall that hid the horizon stood before each of us -- we did not see anything, we did not know anything. I remember this acute sense of impotence well. It was impossible to even think that someday those guilty of the slaughter of Fani and the inhuman butchers of Moro would appear before the courts."³

On their side, the terrorists and their organizations and leaders began to summarize the results. At the same time, in January 1983, L'UNITA commented on the statement by the members of the so-called "Red Brigades" signed by, among others, R. Curcio, one of the founders of the "Brigades" and the best known of their leaders. The statement proposed "dressing in mourning for the years of armed struggle." In the spring of 1983 a group of imprisoned terrorists (among them -- V. Morucci, the head of the Roman "column" in the days of the "Moro case," A. Negri, ideologist of terrorism, well-known political scientist, and professor at Padua University) wrote, "How can one not see the profound difference between the terrorism of recent years and the terrorism of the previous decade? Then armed struggle was an extreme offshoot of the general stream of the movement for social transformations and preserved at least the appearance of an antagonistic plan for such transformations, finding a semblance of self-legitimacy in the sharpness of class conflicts. Nothing like it now exists. Today's terrorism is nothing but an offshoot of the broader and more general trend toward the development of secret, catacomb politics."⁴

In this way, what is imprinted on the memory of society as the "cursed 1970's" and the "years of the bullet" appears in the eyes of terrorist leaders as almost a "golden age" and an epoch of joint struggle for "social transformations." And whether it is deception or self-deception (it is not easy to give an unambiguous answer here), this myth still lives in certain circles, making it difficult to overcome not only extremist psychology and ideology but at times even complicating the work of the legal system. Thus, in August 1984 one of the leading Italian newspapers, CORRIERE DELLA SERA, inserted an interview with Italy's minister of the interior, Scalfaro, who sharply criticized France's position of refusing to hand over Italian terrorists who were hiding there and in particular the atmosphere of virtual admiration for them seen in part of the intelligentsia. "This is a very negative fact. . . . When I remember that 300 terrorists are treated as blood brothers being persecuted by the fascists, I become furious with indignation."

Under such an approach the history of leftist terrorism, already a decade and a half long, seems to be broken into two epochs which are not internally connected. The "lost children" revolt of the 1960's and the "unfortunate angels of the apocalypse" prompted by righteous goals though following unjust paths embody the first epoch, while cynical mercenaries and "dealers in violence" embody the second.

However, the authors of the memorandum quoted are by no means mistaken when they point out the ties of the left terrorism of the 1970's with the general spontaneity of protest of the 1960's-early 1970's. But what was the meaning of these ties and what was the attitude toward society which could be distinguished in the sources of leftist terrorism and which was formed on the basis of a strong attraction to violence as such which is characteristic of the left extremist ideological-psychological complex? The type of leftist intellectual possessed by the hatred of everything "bourgeois" had already been formed long before World War II. This was a hatred so passionate that it was ready to reconcile itself to a universal catastrophe rather than to the spectacle of the so-called "little people" satisfied with their own existence. T. Mann's novel "The Magic Mountain" gives a remarkable representation of this spirit of "bloody love of mankind" in the form of the Jesuit revolutionary Nafta. The intellectual atmosphere of the 1920's-1930's was saturated with this "antihumanist humanism" under which, to paraphrase a famous expression, a person would rather be dead than "bourgeois." This hatred of "what is human, all too human," which recalls Nietzscheism, also tangibly tinged the youth rebellion of the 1960's, in the heart of which leftist terrorism germinated and declared itself.

The Paris "May-68" also celebrated this spirit, which its former participants and even leaders -- A. Geismar, for example, pointed out more than once. Especially stormy debates in regard to this took place in 1978 when the 10th year anniversary of the movements coincided with the kidnapping and murder of A. Moro. Later, in 1981, the former Maoist and writer M. Le Bris stressed especially the idea of a specific psychological complex of attraction to violence as one of the major components of the movement. This complex came out strongly in the cult of sadistic libertinism [libertinazh],⁵ and Le Bris recalls: "Who did not then want to be a libertine and a Marxist at the same time?" The idea of unlimited and sadistically-inclined freedom of desire here was from libertinism while, in Le Bris's view, the yearning to control the course of history was from Marxism. Under such a simplified and false interpretation of Marxism, the moral, humanist goal, which in Marxism controlling the historical process must serve and which is here replaced by the Stirnerian cult of personal desire, is completely eliminated. Nonetheless, it is precisely this interpretation of freedom which has become widespread in leftist circles, and terrorism, the sadistic component of which is very tangibly expressed, to a significant extent also implemented the savage synthesis of sadism and "Marxism."⁶

However, the legitimacy of violence for its own sake and even its feverishly hysterical cult have been nourished from another source which obviously had no relation to Stirner or the Marquis de Sade: the ideology of Maoism. The strange spectacle of educated young Europeans with little red books in their hands now seems incredibly remote, from some other epoch. A large number of

them changed their views long ago while the historical evolution of the People's Republic of China in the last decade⁷ dispelled their illusions about the stronghold of unwavering revolutionism. And what is more, these illusions themselves were to a significant degree rooted in the general atmosphere of myth creation on Eastern themes which was characteristic of the 1960's and the lack of desire to learn the real content of such phenomena as the "cultural revolution," the hongweibing movement, and so forth. After the new Communist Party of China leadership officially condemned this period, the ground was swept out from under the feet of the "Marxist-Leninist" groupings. Nonetheless, before this happened some of their most consistent members managed to move far along the path of conclusions which followed from the basic premise of the Maoism which had spread in circles of the left-extremist Western European intelligentsia.⁸

This premise was precisely formulated by Sartre in his introduction to a book by the French journalist M. Manseaux which came out in 1972, "Maoists in France." Sartre wrote: "When it seemed the idea of violence was ready to breathe its last, groups of people were found who were ready to revive it and return it to the masses. The Maoists were the first among them. They adopted Mao Zedong's formula: 'Power comes from the gun.' It was no longer a matter of signing an appeal or standing around at rallies permitted by the authorities: the revolutionary was created for illegal action."⁹ "May-68," continued Sartre, "marked the rebirth of the idea of uncompromising revolutionary violence and this will be its historical service. An equal service of the Maoists will be the fact that under the onslaught of 'reformism' they have preserved that sacred fire -- such was the blessing of the equation 'revolution-violence'¹⁰ given by the venerable philosopher who did so much to propagandize extremist ideas among those who A. Geismar later wrote of as 'confused activists and revolutionaries without a revolution.' The terrorists in turn tried to fan this fire into a conflagration and while their attempt also failed, for almost 10 years they still managed in Italy to leave their bloody mark on the country's life and carry out, in the words of one of the terrorists, "scenarios of war and death."

The "cursed 1970's" came directly after the "stormy 1960's" in which the libertarian utopia personified by the "hippie" and the "provo" merged with the cult of mythologizing the Chinese "cultural revolution" as the stormy onslaught of "youth" and "life" on the structures of the society and the state which were oppressing them. The concept of "systematic terror" developed on the basis of the youth-student protest movements and the ideology of the "new left" became the bridge between the one and the other. It became widespread in the late 1960's and could signify a very broad, in reality infinite spectrum of phenomena: from direct police repression to "consumer terror," "sexual alienation," and so forth. For this consciousness and psychological mold, the "system" which was subject to violent destruction and annihilation was the entire group of economic, political, social, legal, ethical, and cultural precepts -- the social per se. "One may conclude that extremism-terrorist means precisely and above all destabilization as such" and "simply the destruction" of the entire socium," emphasized G. Bravo,¹² who thoroughly studied the anarchistic precedents of contemporary left-extremist ideology -- from Bakunin and Weitling to Malatesta. The particular interest of the leaders of anarchism, in particular the Italian leaders, in the proles,

criminals, robbers, and gangsters -- the bearers of "revolutionality" per se charged with the enormous energy of social disintegration -- followed from this fundamental yearning for destabilization. It is precisely this "revolutionality" which should be used properly through the "criminalization" of political life -- or the politization of crime: complete and absolute convergence is possible, according to theory.

This extremely persistent and explosive complex of ideas in the bosom of the youth-student revolt and social conflicts of the late 1960's-early 1970's found abundant soil for rebirth -- not least of all thanks to the general spirit of the "new left" ideology with its accent on the repressiveness of the sociocultural system per se and the biological, vitalistic enthusiasm of the subject to be liberated from this repression (focused in the slogans of "sexual liberation"). The "marginals" and the "outcasts," whose image was depicted in the symbols of the constant enmity of Cain and Abel, the "cursed" and the "blessed," appeared as bearers of the energy of disintegration. For the rebels of the 1960's, the outcasts -- almost exclusively representatives of the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America (a region which it was usual to call the "third world" in that epoch) -- are the children of Cain, for whom the hour of revenge is at hand. This type of poetics was beautifully personified by Ch. Baudelaire in his famous poem "Cain and Abel," the very rhythm of which seems to beat the dry and precise drumming of merciless revenge against the entire world and its creator: Sartre's introduction to F. Fanon's book "The Wretched of the Earth" was sustained in the same key; its influence on the political consciousness of the 1960's revolt's participants and the future terrorists was enormous, providing a philosophical and ethical foundation for the cult of absolute violence, identified with revolution.

To what extent did this ideological-emotional complex influence the tactics and modus operandi of the first terrorist groupings and to what extent did it predetermine the selection of those forms in which these groupings tried to coordinate their actions with the "general stream of the movement for social transformations," in the words of Negri and Morucci? In the FRG, where organized terrorism declared itself earlier than in Italy and where the dogma of the "new left" ideology on the working class' loss of its revolutionary potential was professed very rigidly and consistently, "the path from the industrial proletariat to criminals in search of a revolutionary subject"¹³ was traversed very rapidly, although both leading theoreticians of the RAF [Red Army Faction], H. Mahler and U. Mainhof, speak of its sources not as criminals but the marginal elements of society, at times in strong disagreement in interpreting who should be considered such elements. Nonetheless, for the most part they are in agreement: in a sharply negative attitude toward the working masses of the FRG itself who, in complete accord with "new left" spirit and rhetoric, have been treated as "fat" and "bourgeoisified." Basing his concept on the decisive role of marginal groups, Maler wrote: "The bad word 'Lumpenproletariat' perhaps had a certain meaning in Marx's time, but today it is only a counterrevolutionary cliché."¹⁴ Today, according to Maler's thinking, one should speak of "marginal people," and practically everywhere that the Red Army Faction members speak of the revolutionary possibilities of the masses in their documents, they mean either "third world" peoples or the "marginal people" of the "mother country," but not the industrial proletariat. Mahler's brochure was distributed in West

Berlin in 1971; it declared, among other things: "Revolutionary units of the student body rather than organizations of the working class are bearers of revolutionary consciousness." Under such a sharply expressed and rather elitist contempt for the masses of his own country, the tactics of violent actions began to appear like a crack of a whip, fitting to waken these "lazy" masses "who had grown stout" from lethargy. Revolutionary consciousness must be imposed on the "narrow horizons of the immature masses"; another RAF document ("The Urban Guerrilla and Class Struggle") speaks unambiguously of this; it style allows the author U. Mainhof to propose: "We throw bombs against the apparatus of oppression into the consciousness of the masses."

Nonetheless, given the absence of a revolutionary situation and the "immaturity of the consciousness of the masses," such voluntaristic acts only frighten these masses (as happened in the FRG), permitting extreme right forces to play heavily on the theme of the "Red danger."

"If life has gotten worse for unorthodox German thinkers in the last 5 years, it is U. Mainhoff's fault," the English newspaper GUARDIAN later wrote, perhaps overstating U. Mainhoff's personal responsibility but certainly grasping the main vector of changes which the terrorists have introduced into the life of the FRG.

As the terrorists' actions intensified, the breach between them and the population masses grew deeper, and as their inability to consolidate themselves in those strata in which they had put their trust (in particular, among immigrant workers), their casting about in search of a "revolutionary subject" intensified. H. Muenkler notes: "Imaginary subjects declare themselves the bearers of revolution and disappear just as rapidly as they appear. The boundaries between political reality and the imaginary world become more and more eroded so that ultimately psychic reality completely supplants actual reality."¹⁵ This question arose with particular acuteness after the bloody action of 19 June 1972 when 17 workers were injured as a result of an explosion which took place in a building of the Springer Company in Hamburg. H. Mahler wrote afterwards: "It then became perfectly clear that this practice has nothing in common with what we all had imagined it to be earlier since now these militant actions had turned against that part of the people on behalf of whom, it was believed, the battle was being carried out." Nonetheless, it also became "perfectly clear" that a large number of the terrorists, and in particular U. Mainhof, not only did not suffer because of this moral shock but, on the contrary, their tone, their style, and their plans became more and more embittered and cruel, and criticism of "reformism" and "opportunism" intensified sharply, while the very idea of the possibility of revolutionary transformations without violence was branded as treachery. The psychological precept "the worse, the better" begins to dominate while the terrorist actions themselves are now already considered almost exclusively a means to provoke repressive actions by the state and cause its movement to the right.¹⁶ In accordance with this "the worse, the better", the question of the "revolutionary subject" is also decided: the destiny of this subject is to create and intensify the atmosphere of disintegration and the violation of all norms and prohibitions (this will moreover be an act of existential self-emancipation). Reviving the famous and hackneyed thesis of Proudhon, "Property is theft," and replacing, in the words of Muenkler, "political

reality with psychic reality," U. Mainhoff, hysterically excited, wrote in 1973 after suddenly also discovering revolutionary tendencies in the FRG population: "The revolution has already begun! The masses have already consciously freed themselves from the issue of property, which is dominant under capitalism. They are stealing!" Later, in the text "Preliminary Battle Program" written in 1974, Mainhoff developed the thesis in even more detail; according to this thesis growing crime supposedly signals the growing revolutionary preparedness of the population.

Nonetheless, neither the short period of time in which they confined their activity nor the specific features of the situation in the FRG permitted the theoreticians of West German left-extremist terrorism to conduct any large-scale experimental verification of their thesis. On the other hand, the scope which terrorism took on in Italy, the persistence it showed, and those branching and sometimes quite deep roots which it managed to put out in the most diverse levels of the country's social and political life were all factors which created conditions in Italy for a kind of unique test of the fundamental thesis of left-extremist ideology (Bravo justifiably devoted such great attention to Bakunin) on the popular masses as the bearer of the yeast of revolt and social disintegration.

On 7 June 1978 A. Forlani, Italy's minister of the interior, announced: "Terrorism is a virus, potentially powerful in all societies but developing into an unhealthy or even cancerous tumor where the political, social, and economic organism is weak and unable to develop the necessary antibodies."¹⁷ These words contained an indirect acknowledgement of the fact that Italian society had not developed enough of these antibodies.

The sources of contemporary Italian terrorism, like West German terrorism, date from the late 1960's and almost all the same components which the sources of the RAF have are found in its genesis: a close connection with youth-student unrest; eschatological tension; revolt against bourgeois culture; and "t'yermondizm" [possibly "Third Worldism"]. Nonetheless, each of these elements seemed to be enlarged, and revealed itself as the expression of some sore spots of significance to rather broad strata of the population, rather than only a narrow circle of marginalized intelligentsia as in the FRG. In particular, there are the well-known defects of the bourgeois-democratic system in Italy: scandalous corruption; the profound imperfection of the judicial-juridical mechanism; and sharply marked inequality of economic and social development between the industrial North and the agrarian South. All this incited maximal impatience and the desire to immediately go into battle, with weapon in hand, against the "system," while the heat of social and political passions and the vigorous upsurge of the strike struggle in the fall of 1969 kindled the illusions of the future terrorists and forced them to assume a different position in regard to the Italian worker than that of their German "colleagues." In sharp apparent contradiction to H. Marcuse's concept and the "new left" political philosophy based on it in this respect, they tried to put their greatest hopes on the industrial proletariat of their own country, although the formation of the "Red Brigades"¹⁸ took place right in the thick of the student movements of the 1960's. Their "historical leaders," R. Curcio and his wife M. Cagol, were students in the sociology department of the university in Trento, a city of very strong Catholic traditions where the

unshakeable calm was suddenly replaced by the sound of ideological debates and "revolutionary" carnival with all its attributes -- marijuana, sex, and so on. The sociology department, which was strongly influenced by the "new left" and the Maoist "cultural revolution," soon advanced to the vanguard of the student movement.

Nonetheless, the future leaders of terrorism pointedly shunned the carnival and unruly element of the protest with which the history of the RAF is closely interwoven. Their type of behavior was much more severe; from the beginning it gravitated toward politics and war rather than toward "happenings" and extravagant "demonstrations." The interpretation of "politics" which is revealed in it is equally far from "street theater" and from the party rivalry traditional for bourgeois democracy. Rather than "carnival," it had more in common with the spirit of Machiavelli's book "The Prince," where politics is a sphere of genuine passion which does not need the trappings of theater to be attractive and is prepared to step over mountains of corpses to attain its goals. The future brigade members proclaimed their goal to be the waging of armed proletarian revolution and the attacks on large enterprises of the Milan-Turin-Genoa triangle which they began in 1969 had to, so they thought, serve this goal so they could be introduced into the ranks of the proletariat and lead them along to a genuine, austere, and bloody, rather than the carnival-like Paris in 1968, assault on the "stronghold of capital."

The Italian political scientist, A. Barbato, in characterizing this first period in the history of the "Red Brigades" wrote: "The spark of the explosion tore away part of the student movement and sent it on its own anomalous orbit (sociology and solidarity, C. Marigliella and K. Marx, higher education and the industrial enterprise). The transition from a student lecture hall to industrial suburbs was extremely rapid. The nihilistic and minoritarian nature of the first groups was soon skillfully combined with the furious action of the working class..."¹⁹

The "brigadist" A. Bellavita, who was the first to present certain main positions of the "Red Brigades" ideology in the pages of the broad press, in his interview with the daily newspaper L'ESPRESSO insisted that the Red Brigades had a fundamentally different attitude toward the working class than the Baader-Mainhof group had: "The brigades are more rooted in the country's social reality; they try to be among the workers and at plants. Unlike the Germans, they do not count on the abstract internationalism of the armed struggle but are closely linked to the particular features of the Italian situation."²⁰

Even the 1968 Italian youth-student movement itself was much less affected by the "new left" dogma on the working class's loss of its revolutionary potential than in the United States, the FRG, or even in France. The Soviet historian I.B. Levin justifiably notes: "The aspiration to join and be identified with the working class was a constant and basic theme of the student movement. Slogans like 'Students and Workers United in the Struggle' were among the most widespread..."²¹ Likewise, the problem of the working class and the worker movement was by no means posed and attempted to be solved so straightforwardly and unambiguously in the ideology of the left extremist groupings "Potere operaio" ("Potop") and "Lotta Continua," which left behind

the student movement, which went into decline in the spring of 1969, and played a fundamental role in the genesis of left terrorism, as it was with the RAF members. The fundamental role here belonged to the opposition of the proletarian masses as the bearer of the yeast of revolution and the traditional, historically developed forms of the organized worker movement of trade unions, the Italian CP, the Italian Socialist Party, and its "reformist" strategy which supposedly deforms the revolutionary passion of the masses. Thus, in his study devoted to the "brigadist" W. Alascia (the Turin column of the "Red Brigades" was later named after him), who was killed in December 1976, the historian G. Manzini notes that "Potere operaio" and "Lotta Continua" were uncompromising in regard to trade unions, accusing them of being a tool for neutralizing the class struggle and acting in the role of the "fireman" who extinguishes the fire of "proletarian insubordination."²³

In this way, the juxtaposition, characteristic of "new left" ideology on the whole, of the "working class" as social-historical reality, that is, the totality of living people, with their views, value orientations, customs, and historically developed forms and organizations of operation, to the "proletariat" as the spirit of denial and revolt, the bearer of which, according to this conception, in Marx's time was the working class and today is other social groups (student youth and marginal elements, for the most part),²⁴ received an original interpretation in Italy. An attempt was made there which was exceptional in its own way, splitting the real worker movement and the real working class, to separate the "healthy" proletarian core from the skin of "bourgeois institutionalism" and return to it its energy of denial and destruction.²⁵

The terrorists' quest for real ties with regular industrial workers in the triangle was therefore conducted on the basis of an extremely mythologized notion of the proletariat, in essence closer to the traditional anarchic ideal of the outcast proles who thirst for revenge than to any historical realities of the working class and Marxist methods of analyzing them. This complex of ideas received the most expressive embodiment and a new modification in the works of A. Negri, whose "proletariat" is the almost pure destructive energy and mystical personification of revolt per se. As a result, as Bravo notes, with the increase in Negri's influence, revolution is mentioned less and less and "insurrection" -- more and more and almost exclusively: "... since, as Stirner already said, revolt is always subjective and personal; it is a "private" matter, while revolution proposes social and economic transformations."²⁶ "An animal full of life, savage with its enemies, wild and free in its passions -- that is how I would like to see the communist dictatorship,"²⁷ wrote Negri, and all the rhetoric of violent which was abundant in his works depicted the model of the proletariat as a weapon of bloody terror and a battering ram to smash bourgeois society.

Nonetheless, it can be said with great confidence that the real working class decisively rejected that role which the ideology of terrorism sought to impose on it. The failure of this attempt, which focused the hopes of the radical wing of the 1960's protest movements, was eloquently acknowledged above all by the terrorists themselves. Thus, P. Pecci, the former leader of the Turin column of the "Red Brigades" and the most well-known of those who "repented" in the trial of the "Moro case," spoke of the role played in the historical

evolution of the "Red Brigades" and in his own fate by that "'no' which the workers said to our armed struggle and the 'no' which unambiguously turned us into enemies of those who, on the theoretical level, we were trying to represent." One of the most notorious murders committed by the terrorists -- the murder of communist worker G. Rossi at the Italcantieri Shipyard -- was dictated precisely by this sense of failure. In the words of the terrorists themselves, he was killed "as the embodiment of the working class's impenetrability to their influence," and this murder was marked by a style of personal hatred which was not generally characteristic of the "brigadists."

In the memorandum "Do You Remember the Revolution?" which he wrote recently, already in prison, Negri himself verified that the image he created "remained alien to the worker movement."

This breach between the terrorists and the working masses was revealed with enormous force in 1978, in the days of the kidnapping and murder of A. Moro. The national response to this act of the terrorists can be considered exceptional in its scope and in its unanimity. Street protest demonstrations against the terrorists and solidarity with the government, in the words of the Italian communist, A. Minucci, were equal only to the demonstrations of 1945, while the general strike, which began spontaneously at many enterprises, signified a categorical condemnation of the terrorists' actions. As often happens in case of spontaneous responses, it was unforeseen by many people, since the working class's attitude toward the terrorists in the previous period left room for some doubts. Nonetheless, these misgivings were quickly dispelled. "Almost everywhere," wrote L'ESPRESSO, "the workers, often even before the confederation's decisions were announced, spontaneously began to cross their arms on their chests. . ."

Undoubtedly, the element of purely human indignation at the cruelty of the act played an enormous role in this response which was so direct and unanimous, and the significance of this humanistic response to violence should not in any case be underestimated: any social movement is a movement of people with the feelings and ideals inherent in them and the categorical condemnation by the working class of the "Moro act" attested, in particular, to the fact that a real, living worker is not at all inclined to personify the function of bare negation and pure destructiveness which left-extremist ideology assigns to him. Ready in other situations to acknowledge the inevitability of resorting to violence, on the whole he has proved to be hostile to that mystique of violence which nourished the terrorists' thinking, just as it does the global terrorist strategy of "deterrent violence."

Furthermore -- and this is an equally important aspect of the problem -- as it became more and more clear, the goal which the escalation of violence by the terrorists was expected to serve did not gain the support of the working class. Their desire to incite the bourgeois-democratic state to a path of repression instead mobilized the masses in the defense of the democratic institutions which sprang up in Italy out of the antifascist Resistance. Finally, the complex of left-extremist ideas which in itself culminated in terrorism, its social-political orientation, and even the aesthetic and stylistic features alienates rather than attracts the working masses.

This is illustrated, in particular, by the results of a mass survey on the problem of terrorism conducted by the department of problems of the state of the Italian CP Leadership.²⁸ The survey results attest to the almost universal (96.6 percent) condemnation of terrorism as well as to recognition of the seriousness of the problem: 86.3 percent consider terrorism "the most serious" or "one of the most serious" problems of Italian society. A decisive role in the motives for condemning terrorism belongs to humanist ideas: 57 percent of those surveyed condemn it for precisely this reason. In most cases this moral precept was effectively realized: 83 percent of those surveyed stated that they had participated or wanted to participate in strikes and demonstrations against the most serious terrorist acts.

It is also revealing that the overwhelming majority of working people completely rejected the terrorists' fundamental thesis that they "serve working people." Specifically, only 2.6 percent of the workers agree with this; 30.5 percent assume that they serve "the reactionaries instead of working people," while 43 percent assume they serve "political forces attempting to weaken the Italian CP."³⁰

Nonetheless, while we can speak with great certainty of the failure of terrorists' attempts to consolidate themselves among the regular proletariat, things are much more complicated with the mass of semiproletariat, unemployed or partially unemployed, residents of urban ghettos, and all kinds of marginal elements. A description of this social stratum, which includes a description of the so-called "new, mass worker" -- immigrants from the South engaged primarily in unskilled or semiskilled work, has already been given in Soviet literature.³¹ Nonetheless, relatively little study has been done of the experience of events in the spring of 1977 when an attempt was made to directly confront the organized worker movement and the elements of revolt and when the marginal masses were pitted against trade union members as "genuine proletarians compared to those who enjoy the "privileges" of the bourgeois order, as the poor compared to the well-off, as Cain compared to Abel. The very name "Indians of the mother country" which had already been chosen by the movement should have emphasized these features of rejection and marginality of those who it embraced, as well as their readiness for "savage revolt." The following declaration of the "Indians" in 1977 is especially significant: "The new luminary saw our faces with war paint on and our spirit blown apart by the multicolored fireworks of grief, bliss, and love. . . And the hour has come for all human tribes to unite around the great totem in order to sing our songs of war and triumph. . . Down with caution! We will strike up our war-cry, and let our tom-toms sound even louder. . ."

In contrast to the 1968-1969 movement whose zone was the industrial and developed North, the 1977 movement made its debut in the South, in Palermo. In this way it became a "real expression of its economic marginality and quickly established a tie with the marginal elements and the unemployed in general." This was what the deeply specific character of the 1977 movement as compared to the 1968 movement consisted in. Thus, L. Cafiero, the national secretary of the "Working People's Movement for Socialism," noted: "The heroes of 1968 were children of the middle bourgeoisie. Their struggle began as a struggle against authoritarianism. The main problem of today's youth is the

struggle for the work position. Their struggle is the struggle against marginalization."³²

A letter from one girl from Bologna to the famous movie actor, D. Volonte, which the communist newspaper PAESE SERA published in the spring of 1977 gives a fine idea of the potential despair accumulated in the depths of this social stratum: "You know, it's terrible -- after five years of higher education to find yourself behind a register in a store or as an unskilled worker in a plant, but it's even more frightening to expect to find a job, search feverishly in the ads, and finally -- unskilled work, anything to avoid remaining in miserable idleness in an empty present and thinking about a hopeless future in a world you have nothing in common with, among people who are hostile to you. And then when you're in such despair that you no longer believe in anything and you have no idols you can turn to who can give assurance and faith, you rebel. You reject everything in society with the bitterness of a person who never had anything, and this is the fundamental difference between the youth of 1968 and us.

"They were bourgeoisie who spurned their own society of privileges and decline; we are children of the workers to whom so much was promised. We have been shown the 'rosy,' beautiful, rich world of the advertisement: look but do not touch. And then the moment comes when you don't discuss any more and destroy everything."

This theme resounded in many pronouncements and self-descriptions of the "Indians." Thus, in response to a charge of "fascism" made in the press, one of them said: "That is not true: we are only unemployed, we are proletarians who are looking for work."³³

Nonetheless, the discontent of the "Indians," which was completely explicable by their social status, not only spilled out against the government but also against trade unions and the communist party, and it was no accident that the many people formed the impression that someone had very skillfully engineered this very result. Of their relations with trade unions the "Indians" said: "There is nothing in common between us, the unemployed and marginal elements, and the trade union line. Trade unions act against us when they protect those who already have work against the unemployed. They are against us when they reject the struggle to shorten the work day and when they consent to overtime. They take away those small, paltry opportunities which we still have." The famous political scientist A. Roncui noted: "Trade unions have their hands full with people who are already employed; they are not interested in dealing with the unemployed too."

The special terrorist organization, "Worker Autonomy," whose leader and ideologue Negri also became, tried, very successfully, to insert itself at precisely these points of the psychological breach between the workers and the unemployed and between trade unions and the marginal elements. Unlike other, strictly conservative terrorist groupings, the status of the "Autonomy," in particular at first, was very vague. "We," emphasized the "autonomists," "are not an organized group or party but rather a revolutionary sphere which is spontaneously formed in the ghetto of large industrial cities among Lumpenproletarians, women, and marginal people."³⁴

In characterizing the "Autonomy," the newspaper L' UNITA wrote: "The sphere of the 'Autonomy' is an invincible mixture of different groups and trends, a genuine mosaic composed of various names, a gallery of images imposing themselves on each other, a constellation of individual committees, circles, and collectives: outside of any centralized organization."³⁵ This mosaic character was intensified by the nature of the "Autonomy's" activity: arson, robbery, skirmishes with the police, disruption of worker demonstrations, and so forth.

Nonetheless, there are many reasons to think that a far-flung organization with a complex and closed (despite the declarations) structure was hidden behind the apparent spontaneity of these acts. Relations between the conspiratorial underground and the semilegal "Autonomy" are not quite clear even now; nonetheless, on the whole the Italian CP has polemicized sharply with the view of the "Red Brigades" and the "Autonomy" as qualitatively different phenomena.

Thus, Professor U. Giacometti, who spoke at the 15th Italian CP Congress on behalf of the Padua University delegation, emphasized that the opinion that terrorism, in particular, "autonomist" terrorism, is a spontaneous product of unemployment, marginalization, despair, and economic and moral crisis is too hasty. In reality it has good organization and precisely determined objects of action -- universities and ghettos of large cities which are a kind of laboratory to test subversive strategy. The very structure of the "Autonomy," existing underneath like an amorphous element while on the surface gravitating toward the strict organization and conspiratorial nature of the "Red Brigades," reflects its duality: the aspiration to be a maximally broad "sphere" and at the same time, actively influence the political situation, moving it toward civil war.

Relying on the masses of marginalized youth and proles, "autonomist" terrorism, in U. Giacometti's opinion, is potentially more dangerous by virtue of its diffused, blurred, and far-flung nature. It attempts to not only break down the political structure but the very social fabric as well.³⁶

As the later investigation of the "Autonomy" case showed, to a significant extent its role must also have been, by provoking and encouraging large-scale and as diverse as possible violations of the law, to link this anarchistic, "partisan" element with that "regular war" which organized detachments of "Red Brigades" conducted against the government -- to "close the pincers" -- in the words of one of those accused. Translated into common language this means that mass crime was expected and demanded of the masses -- this was the historical role intended for them.³⁷

The spontaneity of the "marginals" also seemed particularly attractive to the "autonomists" primarily because, it appeared, the despairing and politically undeveloped residents of ghettos most conformed to that model of the "proletarian-destroyer" which was carefully thought out in the heart of left-extremist ideology and lauded in Negri's works. It is not accidental that the status and psychology of marginality being endured by the marginals themselves with despair, as was already noted, begins to be extolled in the movement's

ideology as a "special way of life," incomparably superior to the way of life of the bourgeois and the bourgeois institutions integrated by the workers.

Despite the picturesqueness of the rhetoric and the carnival appearance of the movement,³⁸ the reality that stood behind it was too dramatic and threatening and the ideologists of the "Autonomy" could not fail to understand that by deliberately inflating the elements and nuances of the "marginal," and at times criminal style of behavior, they were preventing the positive resolution of the problems which had accumulated, among them those in relations between trade unions and the unemployed, and fanning the fire of revolt. Spontaneous (but as has now been explained, frequently provoked as well) demonstrations with brawls, hissing, and insults interrupting the speakers, and theatricalized mystery plays of the death of "class enemies" -- all this created an atmosphere of rejection of dialogue and the search for ways to constructively solve problems and finally led to meaningless and accidental sacrifices among the working people themselves.

All the elements of this style were nevertheless widely practiced by the "Autonomy," and the writer-communist, M. Spinella, in particular, characterized the spirit of autonomist demonstrations as more "right" than "left." The flourishing cult of violence here and the general spirit of mystical nihilism strongly reminded him of the atmosphere of young Nazi circles which he observed in Germany in his youth.³⁹ The "Autonomist" atmosphere also permeated large enterprises and encompassed some cadre workers, creating a possible breeding-ground for terrorism there; G. Amendola wrote expressively about this: "Who can deny that a direct tie exists between violence at an enterprise and terror?"

On the whole in the 1970's the impression arose that an enormous mass of "marginals," sometimes called the Italian "third world," created a real danger of demoralizing the democratically oriented forms of the struggle for social transformations, among them the organized worker movement, and sinking them in the stream of chaotic violence in pursuit of one end: the destruction of the existing bourgeois-democratic state and the social as such. The concept developed on the basis of left-extremist ideology of the "proletariat" as the personified energy of negation and revolt, though rejected by the working class itself, as was already noted, was to serve this end as well.

Nonetheless, in itself the social reality in which terrorism took root and germinated continues to be complex and dramatic, which is also reflected in the results of the public opinion survey. Sharply and categorically condemning terrorism, most of those surveyed, including the workers, do not believe in the possibility of effectively and fully overcoming terrorism while preserving the present method of governing the country. In recognizing that Italian society has managed to endure the blows of terrorism up to this point, most of those surveyed looked at the future anxiously and very pessimistically: the democratic order will not hold out for long without a profound renovation of the society and state.⁴⁰

For the overwhelming majority of those surveyed (67.9 percent), the main cause of terrorism in Italy is rooted in the authorities' inability to deal with the crisis and social disintegration and renovate state structures.⁴¹

Among the factors which make the terrorists' activities easier, most cite "scandals and all kinds of injustices" (30.6 percent), and then follow "complicity in the state apparatus" (24.8 percent), and inadequate efforts on precautions and preventing crimes and punishing the guilty (20.8 percent). However, critical opinions were also expressed against the state organs which are supposed to conduct the battle against terrorism -- 15.5 percent of those surveyed in general characterize the struggle negatively and 51.8 percent note its inadequacy and ineffectiveness.

On the whole terrorism is viewed as one of the most serious and alarming symptoms of social disintegration, which it in turn facilitates, just as crime does. Crime, which is also rooted in some fundamental defects of society and parasitizes on its problems while in no way helping solve them, also promotes this disintegration. It should be noted that responses to questions on the ties between terrorism and crime attest to the working people's great degree of maturity and ability to judge critically. These ties are always hushed up and ignored by some of the left intelligentsia who are prone to morally defend the terrorists. Yet almost 80 percent of those surveyed said that these ties exist -- regularly or sporadically; the present development of events confirms the validity of this evaluation.

Renouncing their hopes for the regular proletariat, the "Red Brigades" are now developing a new strategy -- "movimentism," which seeks its support precisely in the social stratum of the marginals, who have been used by organized crime intensively and for a long time. Thus, L'UNITA wrote on the attempts of those "brigadists" who fled to Naples to rely on the "Neapolitan proletariat who were outside the law": "The place is already taken, and the terrorists must still settle relations with the "camorra" [a secret criminal organization] bosses. They are seeking and finding new allies." The impression has developed that the "camorra" have taken the remaining "brigadists" who fled to Naples under their protection, but they have also put them at the service of their own interests.

All this, taken together, forms an "explosive mixture" which is particularly dangerous for Italy but may become a model of some new, politicized, and ideologized criminality capable of being transplanted to other capitalist countries as well. The instability of the contemporary political and socioeconomic situation, the intensively progressing process of marginalization, and the growth of unemployment, particularly the unemployment of educated youth -- all this is the essence of the phenomenon, which may create a favorable social medium for the ideology and practices of terrorism in this new, modified variant to take root and expand. An unbreakable tie with the very elements of social disintegration -- in its most alienating and crude forms -- and with the world of secret political intrigues has logically, like an inevitable consequence of the fundamental premises of left-extremist ideology, come to replace earlier attempts, though precarious and sporadic, to coordinate their activity with the transformative aspirations of the working masses. In particular, in February 1983 the secretary of the Italian CP Rome federation, S. Morelli, said in one of his interviews: "Today two phenomena are being revealed which can perhaps be called macroscopic: an alliance between terrorism and crime and the possible expansion of ties between red and

black terrorism. In other words, there is a real danger that terrorism which has suffered political defeat will appear in a new form, more elusive and dangerous because it is less evident."

In this case terrorism begins to function as the enzyme of the accelerated disintegration of bourgeois-democratic institutions and in addition -- a parasitizing structure similar to the mafia type, nourished and enriched by this disintegration. In continuing its persistent line of adamant opposition to terrorism in all its forms and varieties, the Italian CP has been one of the first to record these new trends which make solving a number of the most crucial social problems of contemporary society all the more urgent.

FOOTNOTES

1. See: Ye.G. Plimak and V.G. Khoros, "The People's Will: History and Contemporary Times" in VOPROSY FILOSOFII, No 5, 1981; V. Veselitskiy, "Komu eto vygodno?" [Who Benefits from This?], Moscow, 1981; L. Zamoyskiy, "Taynyye pruzhiny mezhdunarodnogo terrorizma" [Secret Springs of International Terrorism], Moscow, 1982, and a number of others.
2. PAESE SERA, 17 February 1983.
3. PAESE SERA, 25 January 1983.
4. L'ESPRESSO, 26 June 1983.
5. "Libertinazh" -- literally, "dissipation, disorderliness of manners."
6. This question is examined in more detail in the article "On Paths of Revolt: From Protest to Terror" in INOSTRANNAYA LITERATURA, No 3, 1984.
7. As the Italian Marxist researcher G.-M. Bravo notes, in Italy many people date this collapse of the myth on "Red China" to 1976 and it, in turn, played an enormous role in the collapse of the "myth of '68." G.-M. Bravo, "L'estremismo in Italia" [Extremism in Italy], Rome, 1982.
8. Needless to say, it differed fundamentally from Chinese Maoism proper, as the very phenomenon "cultural revolution" in China's actual political and sociopsychological situation was full of substantially different content from its Western copy.
9. M. Manceaux, "Les maos en France" [The Maoists in France], Paris, 1972, p 26.
10. Once again, the idea is not new. In particular, Bravo quotes the words of the notorious Italian anarchist, C. Cafiero, spoken back in 1981 in order to substantiate "propaganda by action": "Our revolution has no other goal apart from itself. This is 'revolution in the name of revolution.'" -- G.-M. Bravo, op. cit., p 221.

11. "Provo" is the name of an anarchistic youth movement in the Netherlands in the 1960's. The name "provo" -- from the word "provocation" -- was chosen by them to emphasize that they intended to provoke the authorities.
12. Ibid., pp 11, 15.
13. This was precisely what one of the chapters of the collective study by a group of West German scientists, conducted in 1978-1980 under the leadership of I. Fetscher and commissioned by the FRG Ministry of the Interior was called. -- I. Fetscher, H. Muenkler, and H. Ludwig, "Ideologien in der Terroristen in der Bundesrepublik" [Ideologies in the Terrorism of the Federal Republic of Germany], Opladen, 1981.
14. Ibid., p 66.
15. I. Fetscher, op. cit., p 68.
16. According to this point of view the election of J. Straus as chancellor of the FRG appeared desirable to U. Mainhof.
17. R. Sole, "Le defi terroriste. Les Lecons italiennes a l'usage de l'Europe" [The Terrorist Challenge. Italian Lessons for Use in Europe], Paris, 1978, p 14.
18. Having become, like the RAF in the FRG, the embodiment of left terrorism of this epoch in general. Neither the RAF, nor even less so the "Red Brigades" were the only terrorist groupings of the left-extremist view; nonetheless, the scope of this article compels inevitable limitations.
19. Quoted from: V. Tessandori, "BR: imputazioni banda armata" [The Red Brigades: Imputazioni Armed Band], Milano, 1977, p 6.
20. L'ESPRESSO, 2 April 1978.
21. I.B. Levin, "Rabocheye dvizheniye v Italii. 1966-1976. Problemy i tendentsii zabastovochnoy bor'by" [The Worker Movement in Italy. 1966-1976. Problems and Trends of the Strike Struggle], Moscow, 1983, p 125.
22. Membership in one of these groupings -- "en route" to the underground -- is a rather common fact in the biographies of many terrorists.
23. G. Manzini, "Indagine su un brigatista rossa. La storia di Walter Alascia," Torino, 1978, p 52.
24. A conception developed most fully by H. Marcuse in the work "Soviet Marxism" and almost universally adopted by the "new left" without any criticism.
25. In June 1983 a polemic between a representative of the "Manifesto" group, R. Rossanda, and a representative of the Italian Communist Party, L. Violante, was published on the pages of the daily L'ESPRESSO. Relying on the latest information, the latter noted, in particular, that

in the ideology of "Potere operaio," the worker movement was seen as a "powerful battering ram which hammers where it must" -- L'ESPRESSO, 12 June 1983.

26. G.-M. Bravo, op. cit., p 98.
27. A. Negri, "Il dominio e il sabotaggio" [Domination and Sabotage], Milano, 1979, p 65.
28. The survey was conducted in the course of several months -- from 2 October 1981 through 5 February 1982; it was of a massive nature (1 million questionnaires were distributed) and moreover selective, oriented to the most representative production collectives.
29. Here and hereafter citations are given to the rotaprint publication, PRIMO RAPPORTO SULL INCHIESTA DI MASSA SUL TERRORISMO, Rome, 7 May 1982, pp 3-4.
30. Ibid., Table 6.
31. See, in particular: Yu.P. Lisovskiy, "Yuzhnyy vopros i sotsial'nyye konflikty v Italii" [The Southern Question and Social Conflicts in Italy], Moscow, 1979; I.B. Levin, op. cit.; "Rabochiy klass v stranakh Zapadnoy Yevropy. K izucheniyu sotsial'nyy osnov politicheskogo povedeniya" [The Working Class in the Countries of Western Europe. Toward a Study of the Social Foundations of Political Behavior], Moscow, 1982.
32. Ibid.
33. L'EUROPEO, 11 March 1977. The subject is an article in L'UNITA where the "Indians" were identified as a "weapon of anticommunist and antidemocratic attack."
34. "The Autonomy of 1974 Today" in PANORAMA 7 March 1978.
35. L'UNITA, 20 February 1979.
36. "On the University of Padua Against Terrorism," L'UNITA, 1 April 1979.
37. "Destroy Everything" was the slogan of the "autonomists" in Bologna.
38. A great deal here outwardly recalled the French "May" -- for example, paradoxical slogans like "We are against the system because we want the moon in the sky!" and the opposition of traditional "politics" and the new style of action as joyful, sensitive liberation, and so forth.
39. One of the "Autonomy" theoreticians, S. Bologna, referred to a number of models of "right extremism" in his works, and, like Negri, concludes with the complete merging of "left" and "right" extremism over which their common denominator -- irrationalism and the egoist cult of one's own desires -- rules undividedly.
40. PRIMO RAPPORTO, 7 May 1982.

41. Fairness demands that it be admitted that back in 1977 this circumstance was pointed out by the very trade union figures at whom the marginals of the "Autonomy" directed the cutting edge of the revolt. Thus, in the words of general secretary of the Federation of Metal Workers F. D'Alema, "the crisis of Italian society, the marginalization of youth, their removal from the sphere of productive labor and social life, and the unsolved problems of education and urbanization were the real cause of the origin of the "Autonomy" sphere. Later, speaking of the problems of Italian youth at one of his press conferences, E. Berlinguer emphasized that contemporary Italian society is a society which "is extinguishing rather than kindling the enthusiasm of young people and which does not satisfy their aspirations not only for labor and learning, but for a more just, humane future as well." Berlinguer then noted that the extremists make skillful use of this circumstance.

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THE FORMATION AND POSITION OF THE TURKISH WORKING CLASS

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[Article by Gennadiy Ivanovich Starchenkov, candidate of economic sciences and senior scientific associate of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Oriental Studies, under the rubric, "The Working People of the Countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America"]

[Text] After World War II, Turkey entered the path of "peripheral" dependent development of capitalism, supported by the imperialist powers, above all -- the United States. Private enterprise, encouraged by the bourgeois state and foreign aid, rapidly supplanted precapitalist methods of production. Turkey has now achieved important socioeconomic goals: in the 1970's it was converted from an agrarian country to an agrarian-industrial country, while by the 1980's capitalist relations had taken the predominant position both in the city and in the countryside. The country has reached the middle-level of developed capitalism according to a number of important indicators.

The arrival of Turkish capitalism at the stage of formational maturity does not mean that the country has completely overcome the multistructural nature which is characteristic of many developing countries. Along with contemporary forms of enterprise (state-capitalist and private-capitalist) many enterprises operate in Turkey which use methods of the initial stage of capitalism. Moreover, precapitalist forms of economy (small-scale commodity, semibarter, and subsistence structures) account for a significant proportion in the country's economy. This multistructured economy also predetermines the incomplete process of class formation. Given a multistructured economy with multiple stages, not only individual strata but contemporary classes as well do not have adequately precisely designated boundaries. Different substrata and transient groups whose quantitative parameters and qualitative condition are continually changing exist between them. Therefore, in Turkey, as in other countries of the East, determining the boundaries and structural subdivisions of the working class, when it is "surrounded by a much greater abundance of transient types -- from the proletariat to the semiproletariat and the petty bourgeois -- than in developed countries"¹ raises many difficulties and reservations. The situation is aggravated by the unsatisfactory condition of Turkish social statistics. All this makes it necessary to supplement official data with expert evaluations.

In 1950-1980 rapid, though uneven growth of the ranks of the working class occurred in Turkey: from 1.4 million (12.7 percent of the gainfully-employed population) to 5.0 million people (27.5 percent)² In number the proletariat approached the petty bourgeoisie, which for many years was the country's largest class.

The process of forming the Turkish proletariat is determined by various factors, two of which are emphasized: in the first place, accelerated industrialization (especially from the 1960's to the end of the 1970's) raised the demand for a skilled and trained work force; secondly, the rapid development of the sphere of trade and services (the third sector) and small-scale production coincided with the increased employment rate for unskilled, often illiterate workers. Not only the quantitative and qualitative composition of the working class but also its substantially increased fragmented nature, where certain groups of workers had developed somewhat unique social make-up, determined the nature of the production of goods and services and the state of the labor market. The quantitative and qualitative growth of the proletariat as well as its increased fragmented nature are related to the sources of formation and the increasingly complex intraclass structure. And positive integration trends by no means play a dominant role in all stages during the formative period of the working class.

Turkey's lengthy "industrial" history resulted in the rise of indigenous reproduction of the proletariat, which is the point where the new type of producer appeared. Indigenous reproduction of the working class had reached a rather high level -- about 30 percent -- by the 1980's.³ The hereditary proletariat (primarily working in large enterprises) is the main bearer of class consciousness. Therefore, the increased level of indigenous reproduction serves as an important prerequisite for the growth of its self-consciousness. However, even up to the mid-1970's, more than half the proletariat was formed through the disintegration and decay of the social categories of the primarily traditional structures of rural areas, as a result of which most workers even today "have firm ties with the countryside."⁴ Small landowners who have been ruined consider hired work temporary, inasmuch as they plan to remedy the situation using wages and return to "their own" business. For a number of years, as Turkish researchers have noted correctly, they "do not have and cannot have class consciousness."⁵ Only in time, if they constantly work for hire under the influence of worker parties and occupational organizations, do they develop proletarian consciousness.

The third source of replenishing the ranks of hired workers arises as a result of the transformation of former artisans, handicraftsmen, petty tradesmen, and entrepreneurs (traditional and contemporary types) who have been ruined as a result of growing competition from large (local and foreign) production. Like small landowners who have been proletarianized, for a long time they keep their small-property-owner ideology and are full of hopes to return to past pursuits.

Finally, a limited number of technical personnel who have merged with skilled workers in terms of conditions of labor and wage level cross over to the category of proletariat. These are so-called white-collar workers (most technical personnel belong to the technical intelligentsia, that is, to the

middle strata of society). Workers who come from the lower strata of employees and intelligentsia are affiliated with the "white-collar" workers by level of education and other indicators.

The process of forming the working class should be examined in the dialectical interaction of all participating factors. Along with class-forming trends, opposite though weaker trends also operate here. We are really talking not only about those workers who have managed to set things right through work and return to their former activity, or the children of workers who got an education and crossed over to the category of employee or engineering-technical personnel. In Turkey it is very significant that a substantial number of workers who go abroad for a few years (in 1983 about 1 million Turkish citizens worked in the countries of Western Europe and oil-producing states of the Near and Middle East) begin to engage in small enterprise upon returning to their motherland,⁶ thereby replenishing the petty bourgeoisie class. Moreover, especially in the years of economic crisis in the country (1978-1980) and in the subsequent stagnation period, some of the workers were fired and gradually lost their class identification (turned into paupers and proles) as a result of entrepreneurs' reducing the number of people working. On the whole, the outflow from the ranks of the proletariat is relatively small.

The fragmented nature of the proletariat usually increases where there is intersectorial distribution. The entire working class is usually divided into three large categories according to the sphere of application of labor: the industrial proletariat; agricultural workers; and workers of the third sector. But intersectorial subdivision by the criterion of the presence or absence of the workers' tie with elements of the scientific-technical system of production forces seems equally important.⁷

Workers in factories and plants, miners, power engineering workers, builders, transportation workers, and signal workers belong to the industrial proletariat. In 1960-1977 industrial sectors were being developed at a rather high rate -- about 10 percent per year. During the country's industrialization, demand rose mainly for a skilled work force at a time when primarily untrained workers were entering the labor market. The shortage of skilled workers (with the general increase in the number of unemployed) became a factor which retarded the development of contemporary production.⁸ But the total number of industrial workers increased from 0.7 million people in 1950 to 2.2 million in 1980.

Contemporary workers are primarily working in factories and plants. Of course, in the manufacturing industry, where about 90 percent of all industrial enterprises are concentrated, large and medium-sized enterprises (with no less than 10 employees and with motor power of 50 horsepower or more) accounted for 2.3 percent of the total number of enterprises in 1950, while in 1980 the figure was 5 percent. It is true that these enterprises accounted for more than half of all workers in the sector. Thus, 809,300 hired employees were working in 9,044 plants of the manufacturing industry in 1980 (52.3 percent of the total number in the sector). And enterprises of the state sector accounted for the largest concentration of workers (437 factories with an average of 661.5 people each).⁹

A study of the data of a census of manufacturing industry enterprises on their state as of 1970 showed that small enterprises operate with a large underload and an enormous number of people working a partial work day or a partial work week. The employment rate is formed under the pressure of the growing mass of unemployed who consent to any unskilled labor with a low level of wages. Profits at these enterprises (or rather -- workshops) is not converted into capital, while by level of equipment used and wages received the hired workers really belong to the pre-proletariat and the pre-factory proletariat. Moreover, by these criteria, workers of the lower echelon of large and medium-sized enterprises, employing 10-50 people, should also be considered pre-factory proletariat. In other words, the contemporary industrial proletariat even in Turkey's most developed sector, which is the manufacturing industry, comprised only about one-third of the hired labor working in that sector. By now, with the development of large enterprises, the capitalist transformation of enterprises employing 10-50 people, and the conversion of some small workshops into branches and shops of large-scale production, one can assume that the proportion of contemporary workers in the processing industry has reached 40 percent.

Hired workers in the agrarian sector comprise a special detachment which in fact is completely formed from rural dwellers who have been ruined: peasants; artisans; and handicraftsmen. The size of this category is growing relatively slowly. In 1950 there were about 300,000 permanent and the same number of temporary workers, while in 1980 the corresponding figures were 615,000 and 750,000. The point here is that agricultural workers who have mastered some specialty which is similar to an urban one join the stream of rural migrants who are trying to find a job in the city. In addition, it would be a mistake to consider all types of seasonal workers and seasonal migratory workers for whom employment is only a supplemental source of income workers. Therefore, it is better to assume that the number of agricultural workers in the first case was 500,000 and in the second -- 800,000.

Hired workers at private feudal estates (farms) and kulak farms are very dissimilar in composition. They differ according to many different criteria. Some of them continue to engage in not inefficient manual labor, but an increasingly larger number of them handle agricultural equipment and other attributes of the "green revolution." Nonetheless, there are still not many workers who have completely torn themselves away from the land¹⁰; this, of course, is reflected in their level of consciousness. Moreover, in some cases workers receive mixed wages for their labor (money and part of the harvest). In these conditions only a small number of workers can be put in the contemporary proletariat category.

In the 1950's a large proportion of workers in the third sector were temporary workers, among them migratory workers. Nonetheless, the rapid development of trade and the services sphere in the 1960's-1970's was accompanied by the formation of an army of permanent workers (although labor turnover still takes place). The replenishment of the working class of the nonmaterial production sphere took place to a substantial degree under the pressure of migrants from the countryside. The number of workers in this sphere rose from 300,000 in 1950 to 2.0 million in 1980. The rate of growth of the proletariat in the

third sector was much higher than in industry and agriculture (it increased by factors of 6.6, 3.1, and 2, respectively).

The overwhelming majority of enterprises in the third sector are small (with less than 10 employees). The workers employed at them for the most part have nothing to do with machines (workers who render technical services are an exception). The nature of the work makes it possible to use unskilled and inefficient labor. It is for this very reason that the employment of workers with a low level of education and use of the partial work day have substantially expanded in trade and the services sphere. However, there is a high demand for the skills and experience of hired personnel at large enterprises.

It should be noted that most workers in trade and the services sphere as well as in small production live in blocks of "gedzhekundu" (dwelling hurriedly raised under a roof in one night), where all migrants from the countryside initially settle.¹¹ The unemployment level is always higher here than in other urban blocks. Even if they manage to work for several years, workers from "gedzhekundu" adapt poorly to conditions of urban life. They maintain a close ties with the countryside (mutual visits with relatives, compatriots, acquaintances, and so forth). The rural style of life is constantly reproduced in their milieu and the new consciousness is introduced and consolidated slowly. They remain aloof for a long time and treat all parties and trade organizations with distrust.

Finally, the fragmented nature of the proletariat is related to certain features of its age-sex structure. Of course, the working class in Turkey is represented by a lesser preponderance of men than in other Moslem countries. In particular, in the 1960's and 1970's a certain increase occurred in the number of women working for hire. In 1980, for example, women accounted for about 35 percent of the total number of people working for hire in agriculture; 9 percent -- in industry; and 14 percent -- in the third sector; while on the whole, the figure was 16 percent, or 875,500 people (and approximately 100,000 women were of unemployable age: 12-14 years old and over 65). The number of men of unemployable age was about 500,000.¹² These categories (less the number of office workers) accounted for more than 20 percent of the total number of workers, or more than 1 million people. Two important general features are characteristic of all of them. In the first place, women and people of unemployable age working for hire have less education than average workers; as a result, they have less opportunity to familiarize themselves with contemporary equipment and technology. Secondly, they feel very uncertain in conditions of the systematic growth of unemployment among men of employable age. To get and keep jobs they often agree to work for part of the set wages, while at small enterprises they may even work without observing the norms of work time.¹³ As a result of the discriminatory system, it turns out that almost one-fifth of the proletariat have limited opportunities to become a contemporary working class. Moreover, this part of the workers are subject to conformism and have little general class consciousness.

However, increasing the educational-skill level of the working class should be considered an important positive change in its qualitative structure. The

growing complexity of the production process in the contemporary epoch urgently demands saturating physical labor with elements of mental labor in the activity of thousands and millions of hired employees rather than individuals. "But the bourgeoisie must have trained workers able to adapt themselves to a high level of technology!" wrote V.I. Lenin.¹⁴ At the same time, for a worker getting a general or technical education is an important prerequisite for increasing his or her class consciousness.

The bourgeois state was presented with the need to sharply expand the network of elementary, secondary, and higher education and to organize special schools for mastering and increasing skills. Turkey's successes on this level are indisputable. Nonetheless, one still must not say that the country has carried out a "cultural revolution." For example, the proportion of literate people (from 6 years and older) rose from 33.6 percent in 1950 to 67.3 percent in 1980 (this is higher than the corresponding level in most countries of the East). But with the rapid growth of the population, the number of illiterate has remained at almost the same level: the corresponding figures are 12.9 million (4.6 million men and 8.3 million women) and 12.3 million (3.9 million men and 8.4 million women).¹⁵ The number of illiterate women even increased by 100,000 in those 30 years. Today one out of five men and one out of two women who are able to enter the labor market are illiterate.

The shortcomings in the general-educational training system could be partially compensated by various courses on acquiring or increasing skills which are periodically opened at large enterprises. But insignificant incentive for this study is practiced in Turkey since skilled workers' wages are as a rule only twice as high as those of unskilled workers.¹⁶

The departure of skilled workers abroad appreciably hinders increasing the qualitative condition of the Turkish proletariat. Back in the early 1960's, the first groups of workers spontaneously left for the countries of Western Europe in search of work. After that, the export of labor was included in government programs which set the goal of reducing the level of unemployment in the country and familiarizing their citizens abroad with contemporary specialties. But the ones who went were mostly other categories of working people rather than the unemployed and untrained. For example, in 1966 the ratio of skilled workers among those who were leaving was 25.9 percent; in 1970 -- 27.0 percent; 1975 -- 51.2 percent; and in 1976 -- already 73.0 percent.¹⁷ The number of skilled workers leaving rose so much that their proportion in the FRG was 2-3 times greater than their corresponding proportion in Turkey.¹⁸ It is not surprising that the state program for 1981 spoke of the need to "replace skilled workers abroad with unskilled ones."¹⁹

Let us also mention in passing other contradictory aspects of the export of labor. After they return to the motherland, many Turkish citizens remain aloof from local workers, while some of them, as we mentioned, prefer to use the money they have saved to open their own small enterprises. In addition, when they return from the countries where they worked in contemporary production (where communist parties operate legally, the working class is organized into trade unions, and the workers enjoy substantial rights and liberties which they have gained in a difficult struggle), many workers join the ranks of class-conscious proletarians.

Thus, the Turkish proletariat is quite diverse. If the sizes of enterprises, the attitude of hired workers toward property, their links with contemporary equipment, and their sociocultural and skill levels are taken into account, then about 25 percent of the 5 million workers can be categorized as the contemporary proletariat. And the number and proportion of contemporary workers increased rapidly in the 1960's and the first half of the 1970's and today maintains the growth trend.

The material conditions of reproduction of the working class have improved on the whole in the last 30 years. The average worker today receives a higher wage, lives in better dwellings, and enjoys a number of privileges which were inaccessible to previous generations. V.I. Lenin noted: "The faster the growth of wealth, the more fully the production forces of labor and its socialization are developed and the better the worker's position to the extent that his position can be better in this system of social economy."²⁰ And he emphasized the importance of "the proletariat's class struggle" and their gaining "laws to protect workers."²¹ The Turkish proletariat has demonstrated increased fighting spirit in this regard; the following data published in the Turkish press attests to this.²²

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>YEAR</u>				
	<u>1966</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1973</u>	<u>1975</u>	<u>1980*</u>
Number of Conflicts	54	112	55	116	220
Number of Workers					
Who Participated	5,259	21,150	12,286	13,708	84,832
Number of Strike					
Days	176,448	241,226	677,345	688,707	7,708,150

*Strikes were prohibited after the coup d'etat on 12 September 1980.

Despite the significant fluctuations in all indicators in some years, one can speak of a growth trend in the proletariat's struggle for its economic and social rights.

The rather successful waging of the strike struggle was possible due to the increased organization and consciousness of the working class. Communists did an exceptionally great deal of work in this direction. As is well-known, the Communist Party of Turkey was formed in 1920 during the national-liberation movement of the Turkish people. Nonetheless, even then it was subject to persecutions and its founder and first secretary, M. Subhi, was savagely killed in 1921 and the party itself was soon banned.²³ In the years after World War II, the Turkish CP, working illegally, made great efforts to unite all democratic forces in the name of the common interests of the working people, but then, as the present general secretary of the party, H. Kutlu, noted, "The left-radical groups disintegrated into many large and small groups."²⁴ But in the 1970's the Turkish CP managed to strengthen its influence on the working class and achieve greater cohesion. Some other parties of working people also did useful work.

The trade union movement has also developed along a difficult, tortuous path. In 1952 a trade union confederation, "Tyurk-ish," was first set up. Its leadership organs fell under the control of large capitalists from the moment it appeared. A number of trade organizations which did not want to follow the appeasement policies of "Tyurk-ish" left it and in 1967 formed their own Confederation of Revolutionary Workers of Turkish Trade Unions -- DISK. The founding of a second trade union center, though it helped the development of the worker movement (a large share of the strikes were organized by DISK), allowed the bourgeoisie to use the discord between the confederations in its own interests.²⁵ Moreover, the bourgeoisie and its parties began to set up new trade unions (several hundred "independent" organizations were organized); this led to the splitting up and weakening of the trade union movement. And the profascist Nationalist Movement Party created its own trade confederation, MISK, whose members broke strikes and broke up demonstrations by the working people.

The development of production forces and the intensification of labor, as well as the continued lack of coordination in the trade union movement allowed the bourgeoisie to maintain or even increase the level of exploitation of hired workers and of all working people. Research by Soviet scientists has shown that the rise in the population's standard of living (like the rise in gross national product) to a substantial degree was achieved by increasing its exploitation. Yu.N. Rozaliyev noted: "Calculations of the degree of exploitation of workers in qualifying industry, based on the materials of industrial censuses, confirm that the norm of surplus value in Turkey fluctuates between 300-360 percent. Thus, according to 1950 data, 239.7 million liras of wages were paid at the enterprises covered by the census and 863.3 million liras of "newly created valuables" were received. Consequently, the degree of exploitation of Turkish workers at that time totaled a minimum of 360 percent. It is apparent from analyzing the materials of the 1962 questionnaire survey in large industry (4,025 enterprises covered) that 1.002 billion liras of wages were paid and a total of 3.580 billion liras of "newly created valuables" were received during the year there at 230 state enterprises, while at 3,795 private enterprises workers were paid 1.075 billion liras and valuables worth 3.220 billion liras were received. In this way, the relationship of surplus value to wages totaled a minimum of 300-360 percent in 1962 as well."²⁶

P.P. Moiseyev drew a picture of the exploitation of agricultural workers which was similar to this one: in 1956 a tenant-owner paid the owner of land at plantations in the Adana region 170 liras in rent (on the basis of 1 hectare of cotton), workers were paid a wage of 140 liras, and his net profit was 166.5 liras. The degree of exploitation of the workers was 240 percent. In the Antalya region rent was 250 liras, wages -- 205 liras, and profit -- 479.2 liras. The norm of exploitation was 355 percent.²⁷

According to our calculations made on the basis of data from the State Institute of Statistics, in the manufacturing industry in 1973 surplus value was 55.0 billion liras, while wages were 14.9 billion liras.²⁸ Consequently, the degree of worker exploitation was 368.8 percent. All this once again confirms the accuracy of K. Marx's conclusion that "even the most favorable situation for the working class. . . no matter how it has improved the

material existence of the worker, does not destroy the opposition between its interests and the interests of the bourgeois and the capitalist."²⁹ At large manufacturing industry enterprises in 1980, the added value was established at 721.3 billion liras, and wages -- at 148.2 billion liras,³⁰ and the degree of exploitation reached 486.6 percent. As we see, despite the drop in production, during the years of economic crisis the Turkish bourgeoisie increased its profits through intensifying exploitation of the proletariat.³

In the late 1970's the Turkish bourgeoisie could feel how rapidly the strike struggle was expanding, the domestic political situation was heating up, and the conflict between right and left groupings was intensifying. In the same period political murders, the taking of hostages, and all kinds of anarchistic actions reached unheard-of proportions. But the bourgeoisie was frightened most of all by the fact that the strike movement had taken on a political character; events in Izmir most clearly confirmed this. In February 1980 a strike began in the city's textile enterprises as a sign of protest against mass firings and unemployment. The city's working people supported the strikers, coming out for a demonstration of solidarity. Barricades on which the strikers waged an unequal battle with the forces of "order" appeared around the closed enterprises and in some regions of Izmir. The textile combine was taken only with the help of tanks and armored personnel carriers of army assault subdivisions. Arrested and taken to the local stadium were 1,500 workers who had defended it. Then soldiers and police laid seige to the Gyultepe block where the residents who had barricaded themselves in had put out red flags and were broadcasting the "Internationale," the proletarian hymn, on a loudspeaker. In the clash that took place, several people were killed, more than 100 wounded, and more than 700 arrested.

The events in Izmir evoked a broad response throughout the entire country. Many workers and trade union organizations protested against the authorities' actions in that city. At the same time, for the first time workers, office workers, and students in Izmir itself and in the capital staged solidarity strikes which are considered banned and therefore illegal. The events of the first eight months of 1980 showed that the Turkish proletariat is becoming more and more instilled with the spirit of militancy, cohesion, and solidarity.

On 12 September 1980 generals headed by army chief of the general staff K. Evren staged a coup d'etat, as a result of which the S. Demirel government was overthrown, parliament dissolved, the activity of political parties prohibited, and the operation of the constitution suspended. A government headed by retired admiral B. Ulusu was soon formed. A military dictatorship was established in the country. One of the main goals of the coup d'etat was to suppress the worker movement or take it under control. Therefore, the military regime attacked the Turkish CP and a number of legal worker organizations most forcefully. Thousands of progressive workers and democratic figures were arrested and sentenced to long periods of imprisonment by "emergency courts." Some of them who did not survive tortures during interrogation died.

The military authorities undertook an attempt to reorganize the country's social life, in particular the political and trade union leadership of the working class, in their own way. In late 1982 a constitution was adopted (with its adoption K. Evren became the country's president for a 7-year term) which envisions that new political parties must present reports on the receipt and expenditure of monetary means to state organizations; they are prohibited from establishing ties with trade unions³²; and their programs and leadership body must be approved by the military authorities. In accordance with the new directives, 3 of the 15 parties which had declared their formation were allowed to participate in the parliamentary elections of late 1983. The formation of a civilian government was entrusted to T. Ozal, leader of the Motherland Party which won the elections. T. Ozal had been a member of the governments of S. Demirel and B. Ulusu. Three more parties passed through the eye of the "military democracy's" needle to the municipal elections in the spring of 1984. However, the Turkish CP remained banned while other progressive parties were not permitted to be politically active. Uncertain in its hope of controlling the political situation, the Turkish bourgeoisie also intends to keep the Turkish proletariat without legal party leadership in the future.

The military command behaved somewhat differently with trade union organizations. After the coup d'etat, all trade union confederations with the exception of "Tyurk-ish," which was guided by the principle of "cooperation" between labor and capital, were prohibited. Moreover, the former general chairman of "Tyurk-ish" was named minister of labor in the military government. The leaders of the Disk trade union confederation were arrested, while their "files" were sent to be examined by "emergency courts." And even before the protracted legal proceeding had been completed, the military command permitted the activities of the MISK nationalist confederation to resume. According to calculations of the Turkish bourgeoisie, the workers must now join the right or the extreme right confederation.

The activity of trade unions, like political parties, was henceforth regulated. Article 52 of the Constitution envisions: "Trade unions. . . cannot pursue political goals, engage in political activities, receive support from political parties, or give them the same." And further on: "Trade unions cannot use revenue beyond their own goals and must keep all their receipts in the state bank."³³ All these points are focused on isolating the trade union movement and establishing control over trade union activities. At the same time workers' right to strike was taken away and freedom of speech, of the press, and of street marches and demonstrations was fundamentally restricted. The articles of the criminal code which envision punishment for communist activity and propagandizing progressive ideas were made more severe. The reorganization of social life led to a significant stifling of the rights and liberties of broad strata of the population.

Of course, the Turkish bourgeoisie understands that repression and restrictions alone will not break the worker movement. Therefore, the authorities' present activities are accompanied by advertising the implementation of broad social measures. In particular, T. Ozal's government has announced its intention if not to solve the problem of employment, to at least reduce its severity. Facts confirm, however, that this problem is

becoming more and more intensive. Thus, at the height of the economic crisis of 1978-1980, there were 2.8 million unemployed (13.4 percent of the able-bodied population). After the coup d'etat, during the depression, the number of unemployed continued to grow and totaled 3.1 million in 1981 (17.5 percent). Despite a certain revival of the economy, the army of unemployed reached 3.6 million (20 percent) in mid-1984.³⁴ The problem of unemployment has become the number one social problem of contemporary Turkey.

In attempting to demonstrate its "concern" for the working class, for a long time the government has been discussing a draft of a law which envisions paying assistance to unemployed people for 8 months (to this day the unemployed do not receive assistance). The total of the grant has been tentatively set at 40 percent of the monthly wage which workers and office workers received before they lost their jobs. Unemployed people younger than 16 and older than 65, as well as those who were fired from their jobs for participating in strikes, will not receive assistance. Both the military and the civilian governments periodically increase the wages of workers and office workers, thereby demonstrating their "concern" for the working people. Nonetheless, in conditions when prices for consumer goods "balloon like missiles" and inflation reaches 30-40 percent per year, these increases are completely for publicity purposes. According to calculations of the State Planning Organization and the Tyurk-ish confederation, the price rise since 1979 exceeds the growth in wages by approximately 60 percent.³⁵ As a result, the standard of living of workers and office workers, which began to decline after the economic crisis, was at the 1976 level in 1984.

The growing dissatisfaction of the working people has already had an effect on the results of the 1984 municipal elections. The ruling Motherland Party lost about half a million votes, while the other two parties lost even more. On the whole, "nonparliamentary parties" gathered more votes than all the so-called parliamentary opposition. In practice (but not juridically) the government does not have the support of most voters.

The intelligentsia has also expressed its critical attitude toward the new system of government. In the summer of 1984, 1,256 public figures (among them the universally renowned writers, A. Nesin and Y. Kemal, actress T. Sharay, and others) signed a petition on behalf of all working people which was then sent to the country's president and the chairman of parliament. The authors of the petition expressed serious concern for the fact that in Turkey elementary democratic rights and liberties are being trampled upon, and they appealed to the authorities to declare a broad amnesty for political prisoners and to stop the torture of people during interrogations and cruel treatment of arrestees. They also proposed abolishing censorship of the press, lifting the emergency military status, and granting citizens the right to participate freely in political life.³⁶ In fact they proposed reviewing a number of articles of the constitution.

In the conditions which have been created even the Tyurk-ish leadership decided to hold a worker demonstration in June of last year after the coup d'etat; more than 5,000 Istanbul workers took part. The activists who demonstrated there criticized the government's economic policy, spoke about the need to abolish a number of restrictions on occupational activity, and

demanded higher wages. Then in October 1984 dock workers of two Istanbul dockyards declared the first strike. They demanded that the administration pay wages which had been held back for several months and improve working conditions. Six workers parties, including the Turkish CP, who joined together for the first time under the difficult conditions of illegal work, spoke out for restoring the full rights of workers to strike and freedom of speech, of the press, and of conducting rallies and demonstrations. They also demanded that the persecution of worker-activists be stopped and political prisoners be immediately freed.³⁷

What has been presented above permits us to conclude that the nature of the formation of the working class, the diversification of its structure, and the absence of the necessary conditions for the activity of the proletarian party and trade union workers complicates the multifaceted developmental process of the working class, especially that part of it which is not involved with contemporary means of labor. Nonetheless, the objective prerequisites for stepping up the activity of the proletariat and the formation of its class consciousness expand according to the degree of industrialization. Therefore, administrative measures which impede growth in the cohesion and organization of the proletariat can only hold back its forward movement temporarily. Turkey's working class is now entering a new stage of its development and struggle.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Zarubezhnyy Vostok i sovremennost'" [The Non-Soviet East and Contemporary Times], Moscow, 1980, Vol 1, p 317.
2. Here and hereafter the general and sectorial estimates of the size of the working class are cited from: P.P. Moiseyev, "Agrarnyye otnosheniya v sovremennoy Turtsii" [Agrarian Relations in Contemporary Turkey], Moscow, 1960, p 33; Yu.N. Rozaliyev, "Osobennosti razvitiya kapitalizma v Turtsii" [Features of the Development of Capitalism in Turkey], Moscow, 1962, pp 299-301; Istatistik yilligi 1952," Ankara, 1953, p 47; 1981, p 154; "Turkiye istatistik cep yilligi 1982," Ankara, 1982, p 73.
3. According to some sources this level is 24 percent, and according to others -- for skilled workers -- 33 percent and 35.6 percent for unskilled workers (C.O. Varlier, "Turkiyede kazanc esitsizliklerinin nedenleri," Ankara, 1982, p 65; "The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Turkey," New York and London, 1980, p 490.
4. P.P. Moiseyev, "Sotsial'naya struktura obshchestva. Problemy razvitiya stran sovremennogo Blizhnego i Srednego Vostoka" [The Social Structure of Society. Problems of the Development of Countries of the Contemporary Near and Middle East], Moscow, 1981, p 132.
5. J. Tekeli, J. Guluksuz, and T. Okyay, "Gecekondü, dolmuşlu isportali şehir," Istanbul, 1976, p 214.
6. N. Abadan, "Turkish Workers in Europe 1960-1975," Leiden, 1976, p 231.

7. On this division see: RK I SM, No 2, 1984, p 137; NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, No 3, 1984, p 121.
8. In the early 1970's, 347,900 skilled workers were registered on the labor market, while 503,500 of them were needed, that is, the demand was only 60.0 percent satisfied (MILLIYET Collection, Istanbul, 1971, p 261).
9. Cited from: "Turkiye istatistik cer yilligi 1982," Ankara, 1982, pp 73,135.
10. "Turkiye komunist partisi program. TKP yayinlari," Kasim, 1983, p 23.
11. R. Keles, "Turkiyede sehirlesme, konut ve gecekondu," Istanbul, 1978, pp 191,192.
12. Cited from: "GENEL NUFUS SAYIMI NUFUSUN SOSYAL VE EKONOMIK NITELIKLERI. % 1 ORNEKLEME SONUCLARI, 2 October 1980," Ankara, 1981, pp 16-18.
13. For example, the average wage of a worker was 8,610 liras per month, while for persons less than 16 years old -- 5,700 liras, or 66 percent of the established level. MILLIYET, 29 April 1981.
14. V.I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochinenii" [Complete Works], Vol 16, p 340.
15. CUMHURİYET, 9 August 1977; GENEL NUFUS SAYIMI. . ., op.cit. fn 12, 12 October 1980, p 3.
16. "Manpower Mobility Across Cultural Boundaries," Leiden, 1975, p 100.
17. "İktisadi rapor 1977," Ankara, 1978, p 71.
18. N. Abadan, "Turkish Workers in Europe 1960-1975," Leiden, 1976, p 157.
19. "1981 yili programi," Ankara, 1981, p 315.
20. Lenin, op. cit., Vol 2, p 139.
21. Ibid., Vol 6, pp 225, 245.
22. "İktisadi rapor 1980," Ankara, 1981, p 44.
23. "Turetskaya respublika (Spravochnik)" [The Turkish Republic (A Manual), Moscow, 1975, p 417.
24. PMS, No 3, 1984, p 31.
25. A.A. Guseynov, "Profsoyuzy v Turtsii (1960-1970)" [Trade Unions in Turkey (1960-1970)], Moscow, 1975, pp 23, 24, 84, 88.
26. Yu.N. Rozaliyev, "Klassy i klassovaya bor'ba v Turtsii (Burzhuaziya i proletariat)" [Classes and the Class Struggle in Turkey (The Bourgeoisie and the Proletariat)], Moscow, 1966, pp 126-127.

27. P.P. Moiseyev, "Agrarnyy stroy sovremennoy Turtsii" [The Agrarian System of Contemporary Turkey], Moscow, 1970, pp 224-225.
28. Cited from: "Year Book of Labour Statistics," 1978, pp 7, 13.
29. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Sochineniya" [Works], Vol 6, p 451.
30. Cited from: "Turkiye istatistik cep yilligi 1982," 1982, pp 134-135.
31. With a more precise estimate the norm of exploitation would total more than 300 percent in 1973, while in 1980 -- more than 400 percent; however, this does not change the general conclusion.
32. "Anayasa," Ankara, 1982, pp 8, 9, 11.
33. Ibid., pp 7, 9.
34. "Iktisadi rapor 1981," p 36; MILLIYET, 12 October 1984.
35. PRAVDA, 18 August 1983.
36. PRAVDA, 8 June 1984.
37. YENI CAG, No 5, 1984, p 106.

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